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ABSTRACT
This Article proposes that child welfare law permit the non-exclusive
adoption of foster children who cannot reunify with their parents—that is,
adoption by foster parents without severing children’s legal relationships
with their biological parents. Present law imposes a choice: extended
family members or other foster parents may adopt foster children
exclusively—and terminate the legal relationship between the child and
biological parents—or they may become guardians—which preserves
parent–child relationships but denies foster parents the legal title of
“parent,” even when they are long-term primary caretakers.
Non-exclusive adoption would respect the lived reality of many foster
children by legally recognizing all parents in their lives. Biological
parents, even those who cannot reunify with their children, retain an
important role for many foster children. Foster parents serve as functional
parents and often see themselves, and are seen by children, as parents.
Moreover, creating an additional legal path for foster children to leave
foster care to new permanent families may help many children and families
find legal options that minimize unnecessary litigation.
Some courts and legislators have recognized multiple parenthood,
especially for children conceived through assisted reproductive technology
(ART) and raised by same-sex partners. Yet multiple parenthood faces a
core challenge—multiplying the number of legally recognized parents can
multiply legal conflicts over children. Non-exclusive adoption in child
welfare has a compelling answer. Child welfare law’s experience with
guardianship demonstrates one field where multiple parenthood is less
radical than it appears at first. It also demonstrates that the law can
effectively allocate parental authority to avoid such conflicts by granting
the adoptive parent legal and primary physical custody. While a hierarchy
of parental rights raises equality concerns in ART cases, it is appropriate
in child welfare cases which, by definition, involve biological parents who
have been found unfit and unable to reunify with their children.
I. INTRODUCTION
Darnell Jr. was born to his mother, Tameka, and his father, Darnell Sr.,
when they were fifteen and sixteen, respectively. Tameka’s mother had
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physically abused her when she was a young child and became verbally
abusive when she learned of Tameka’s pregnancy, leading Tameka to run
away. Meanwhile, Darnell Sr. was arrested for armed robbery and placed in
juvenile detention while Tameka was pregnant.
Darnell Jr. was born premature and spent several weeks in the hospital
after birth; Tameka had been discharged two days after the child’s birth.
When he was ready for discharge, Tameka panicked. She had no family to
count on, no stable place to stay, and doubts about her ability to raise
Darnell, so she did not go to the hospital to pick up her son. Hospital staff
soon called child protection authorities who took Darnell from the hospital
to a foster home. Upon discovering Tameka’s situation, those authorities
also placed Tameka in foster care. They soon identified Tameka’s
godparent, Terrence, who offered to have both Darnell and Tameka live
with him. Darnell was placed there at the age of one month. Tameka was
placed there for several months as well. She helped Terrence raise her son
until he was eight months old, but repeated behavioral challenges led the
foster care agency to place her in a group home.
Fast forward two years. Darnell Jr. has lived with Terrence since his
discharge from the hospital. Tameka visits and has a relationship with her
son, but has dropped out of school, and cycled through multiple foster
homes and group homes. She sees herself as Darnell’s mother but also
recognizes that Terrence has raised her son and is closely bonded to him;
she wants Terrence to continue to raise him because she believes that will
give Darnell Jr. a better life. (She and Terrence, meanwhile, remain in
friendly contact, but agree that Tameka should not live with Terrence
again.) Darnell Sr. will soon be released from a juvenile detention facility.
He has visited with his son every month. He does not think that he can raise
Darnell Jr. well while also taking care of himself. He sees himself as
Darnell Jr.’s father and wants to maintain his relationship, but is willing to
allow Terrence to raise Darnell.1
At this point, Terrence is Darnell Jr.’s primary caregiver; he is the sort
of individual that in a prior generation would have been deemed a
“psychological parent,”2 and whom contemporary theorists would call a

1. This summary is based on a real case in which I was involved as a clinical instructor at the
Washington University School of Law in St. Louis. Although based on a real case, I have changed
names and other identifying details. I will refer to Missouri statutes throughout this Article both as an
illustrative example of state adoption law and because this case, to which I will return throughout the
Article, arose under those statutes.
2. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST
DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE 11–13 (1996) (describing psychological parent concept and concluding
that any caregiving person can assume that role); Susan Frelich Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37
HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 28–29 (2008) (describing the ongoing impact of the psychological parent
concept).
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“functional parent.”3 Darnell Jr. calls him “Daddy.” Family law, and child
welfare law especially, has moved towards respecting the actual caregiver
relationships that children have,4 creating a strong impetus to grant
Terrence and Darnell Jr.’s relationship a permanent legal status. At the
same time, Darnell Jr. has a relationship with his biological parents;
Darnell Jr. calls Tameka “Mommy” and calls Darnell Sr. “Papa.”5
The child welfare system will seek to provide Darnell Jr. with
“permanency”—that is, a legally permanent relationship with his primary
caregiver, which would transfer custody and decision-making authority to
that caregiver, thus ending the state’s legal custody. Permanency is
essential to child welfare law and practice, and for good reason: it is far
better for a family with a legally permanent relationship with a child to
raise that child than for the child to grow up in state custody.
The legal question becomes which legally permanent relationship is the
best option for a particular child, a question which requires exploring the
child’s relationship with both biological parents and the child’s potential
caregivers. In Darnell Jr.’s case, if reunification with a parent is not
possible, then the child welfare system will look to Terrence to become a
permanent caregiver because only Terrence can provide the continuity of
care that generally serves children’s interests.6 The law values this
continuity via statutory preferences for existing foster parents as potential
adoptive parents.7
Our present legal system in almost every state provides up to three
options to create permanency between Terrence and Darnell Jr.: exclusive
adoption without contact (closed adoption), exclusive adoption with
contact, and guardianship.8 Not long ago there would be only one option—
closed adoption. Now child welfare law offers other options which seek to
better reflect children’s real-world relationships with both their new
permanent caregiver and their birth parents. These options’ existence
reflects significant progress in the child welfare field. It has led to tens of
thousands more children leaving foster care to permanent families, while
better respecting children’s ongoing relationships with birth families. These
other options also give kinship and foster parents a choice between legal
3. See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. L.
REV. 649, 697 (2008).
4. See, e.g., Naomi Cahn, The New Kinship, 100 GEO. L.J. 367, 394 (2012).
5. The words children use to refer to adult caregivers are cited frequently in custody and
adoption cases. E.g., In re Adoption of J.T.A., 988 N.E.2d 1250, 1252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (“The
record indicates that . . . the Child refers to Fiancée [adoptive mother] as ‘mom,’ . . . .”).
6. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal
Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 902 (1984)
(noting the importance of continuity to children’s development).
7. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 453.070.7 (West 2014).
8. Infra Part II.
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statuses that best reflect their identity and relationship with the child in
question. Nonetheless, these options all structure parenthood as exclusive;
if Terrence adopts Darnell Jr., then Tameka and Darnell Sr. cease to be his
parents. If Terrence becomes Darnell Jr.’s guardian, he is not his parent,
and Tameka and Darnell Sr. remain parents.
This Article argues that these options still exclude the most logical
description of Darnell’s family situation: he has three parents, and the law
should permit recognition of all three. One parent, Terrence, should have
primary custody and should have the bulk of decision-making rights. Two
parents, Tameka and Darnell Sr., are parents—and are seen as such by
Darnell Jr. They should visit frequently and be recognized as legal parents,
but they should not be able to interfere with most of Terrence’s day-to-day
parenting choices. Recognizing this reality requires non-exclusive
adoption, in which the law recognizes a third person (here, Terrence) as a
child’s parent without terminating the child’s relationship with his
biological parents.9 Such recognition would respect the lived reality of
Darnell’s relationships, providing a useful means of achieving permanency
for Darnell while avoiding potentially harmful litigation.10
Non-exclusive adoption would challenge two ideas about adoption and
parenthood that have formed the core of family law, and are tenets of
existing child welfare and adoption law. First, the law has provided that no
more than two people can have the legal identity of a “parent” of a
particular child at the same time. Second, the law has required adoptive
parents to have a marriage or marriage-like relationship with each other,
replicating the norms of two-parent biological reproduction; if Terrence
had a partner, she or he could adopt the child with him. Otherwise, existing
statutes draw a bright line between Darnell’s biological parents and
Terrence; absent a marriage or marriage-like relationship, adoption statutes
as presently understood preclude Terrence from adopting Darnell Jr.
without terminating his legal relationship with Tameka and Darnell Sr.11
9. One could easily change the hypothetical to involve only two parents—and thus not challenge
the general rule against more than two parents—or as many as four parents. If one biological parent was
deceased, or so abusive to the child or had such a negligible relationship with the child that a
termination was appropriate, then a non-exclusive adoption would recognize only two parents—the
adoptive parent and the remaining biological parent. If the foster parent had a spouse or partner, they
could adopt as well, leading to four parents—two adoptive and two biological. To keep the core
hypothetical simple without avoiding the challenge to the rule of two, I will limit the possible parents to
three.
10. Infra Part III.
11. Missouri statutes, for instance, provide that adoption generally terminates the relationship
between biological parents and children. MO. ANN. STAT. § 453.090 (West 2014). One clear exception
exists—stepparent adoption, which requires the adoptive parent to be married to the biological parent.
MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 453.090.1 & 453.010.4 (West 2014). Similar provisions exist in the Uniform
Adoption Act (UAA): UAA § 1-105 provides that an adoption by one parent terminates the legal
relationship between the biological parent and the child; the biological parent becomes known as the
“former parent.” The only exception is for stepparent adoption, which requires the stepparent to be
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Non-exclusive adoption would change that, permitting both legal
recognition of more than two parents, and joint parenthood without a
marriage-like or sexual relationship of any sort between Darnell’s
biological parents and Terrence.
These traditional elements of legal parenthood—the rule of two, and
the conjugal nature of parenthood—have come under increasing attack in
recent years, especially as same-sex couples and assisted reproductive
technology (ART) have challenged traditional family law norms. Those
who have attacked these traditional pillars of family law are selfconsciously “radical.”12 Somewhat curiously, these attacks have rarely used
child welfare cases to challenge these norms, even though child welfare has
long given greater weight to the lived relationships between children and
adult caregivers, not only the legal relationships between adults. Child
welfare cases thus present examples where challenging the rule of two and
the conjugal nature of parenthood is not nearly as radical as it may seem at
first. Child welfare cases also provide compelling and ready answers to
legitimate criticism of recognizing multiple parenthood—especially the
concern that expanding the number of parents will expand the amount of
conflict over children. Child welfare law regarding guardianship already
establishes a hierarchy of caregivers, and has an empirical record of largely
avoiding the feared conflict. While such a hierarchy could be problematic
outside of child welfare—because it would challenge the law’s
commitment to equality among parents—it would naturally fit in child
welfare law, especially cases involving a fit adoptive parent and a parent
found to have abused or neglected a child in the past.13
This Article argues that non-exclusive adoption will better serve some
children like Darnell Jr. and their parents (birth, foster, and adoptive) than
other permanency options, and thus should be a permanency option in child
welfare cases. Legislative and litigation-based reform strategies could make
third-party adoption possible; indeed, in late 2013, California enacted
legislation that will permit non-exclusive adoption, although this legislation
is not without its problems.14 Non-exclusive adoption would be based on
the consent of all parents; if all parties agree, Terrence should be able to
adopt Darnell Jr., and thus adopt the legal identity of a parent without
terminating Tameka and Darnell Sr.’s identity as Darnell Jr.’s parents. This
married to one of the child’s parents. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 4-102(a) (1994). The UAA would limit
the consequence of stepparent adoption slightly—preserving the former parent’s right to visit and the
child’s right to inherit from the former parent. I explore possible chinks in this statutory armor, infra
Part V.B.
12. E.g., Michele Goodwin & Naomi Duke, Parent Civil Unions: Rethinking the Nature of
Family, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1337, 1342 (2013) (“This Article urges a radical rethinking of
family . . . .”).
13. Infra Part III.
14. Infra Part V.A.1.
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adoption should, like guardianship, provide Terrence with full legal
custody, while reserving a right to visit (and other rights, such as the right
to consent to any future adoption) to Tameka and Darnell Sr. Like
guardianship, if circumstances change substantially, Tameka or Darnell Sr.
could seek to regain custody; unlike guardianships in many states, they
would not be entitled to any preference that parents receive in disputes with
non-parents.15 Like adoption, and unlike guardianship, the adoption should
not be subject to termination; Terrence would not be permitted to return
Darnell to foster care without consequence, and if Tameka or Darnell
regained custody, Terrence would retain a right to visit.16
II. EXISTING OPTIONS
In decades past, when a foster child could not reunify with a parent,
exclusive adoption was the only legal option available for that child to have
a new, permanent family. As explained below, child welfare law has
evolved, and now offers permanency options on a spectrum in cases when
foster children cannot return home. For a child like Darnell Jr., existing
child welfare law offers up to three options for providing a new, legally
permanent family:
First, Terrence could adopt Darnell Jr. through a traditional, exclusive
adoption—one that terminates Tameka and Darnell Sr.’s relationship with
and all parental rights over Darnell Jr. Terrence would become Darnell Jr.’s
only legal parent, and Tameka and Darnell Sr. would become legal
strangers to their son. This does not mean that they will have no
relationship with their son; Terrence could permit Darnell Jr. to have as
much contact with Tameka and Darnell Sr. as Terrence sees fit. Many
adoptive parents permit significant contact.17 But, as a matter of law,
Tameka and Darnell Sr. would not have any right to visit; Terrence would
have been substituted for Tameka and Darnell Sr. as Darnell Jr.’s parent,
endowed with the parental authority to determine who the child can see.
15. Case law in multiple states holds that a parent seeking to terminate a consensual guardianship
that does not include a finding of unfitness is entitled to a presumption that termination serves the
child’s best interests. E.g., Tourison v. Pepper, 51 A.3d 470, 473 & n.11 (Del. 2012) (collecting cases
and holding that fit parents are entitled to a presumption that they serve their children’s best interests
when they seek to terminate a guardianship); Troeskyn v. Herrington (In re Guardianship of S.H.), 409
S.W.3d 307, 316 (Ark. 2012) (collecting cases and adopting the “majority view . . . that parents who
have not been found unfit do not relinquish their fundamental liberty interest . . . and, thus, they are
entitled to the Troxel [v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)] presumption [that they are fit and that, as fit
parents, they act in the child’s best interests]”).
16. Infra Part IV.
17. Connections between adoptive and biological families have become increasingly common,
with some asserting that there is now a “consensus . . . that greater openness offers an array of benefits
for adoptees.” ADAM PERTMAN, ADOPTION NATION: HOW THE ADOPTION REVOLUTION IS
TRANSFORMING AMERICA 4–5, 11 (2000).
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Second, Terrence could adopt Darnell Jr. and agree to a post-adoption
contact agreement with Tameka and Darnell Sr. This option is identical to
the first except for the contact agreement, which gives Tameka and Darnell
Sr. a right to continue their relationships with Darnell Jr. Such an
agreement is legally enforceable—if a court finds that enforcement is in the
child’s best interests—in at least twenty-six states plus the District of
Columbia which have adopted post-adoption contact agreement statutes.18
While a post-adoption contract makes Terrence the parent of Darnell Jr., it
gives Tameka and Darnell Sr. the right to visit with Darnell Jr.; this
visitation right does not mean that they remain parents. The adoption
would still terminate their parent–child relationship with Darnell Jr. and
thus declare the child’s “Mommy” and “Papa” to no longer be his parents.
Third, Terrence could become Darnell Jr.’s guardian. Guardianship
would also give Darnell Jr. permanency, by making Terrence his
permanent guardian with full legal custody. It would respect Tameka and
Darnell Sr.’s ongoing relationship with Darnell Jr. by maintaining both a
right to visit and their identity as Darnell Jr.’s parents. Depending on the
state, parents may retain other authority, such as the right to consent to a
later adoption or to determine the child’s religion.19 Maintaining the legal
parent–child relationship is a central element of guardianship and a core
reason for its appeal.20 Indeed, kinship caregivers often express reluctance
to adopt (and thus a preference for guardianship over adoption) because
they do not want to disrupt family relationships in the way that traditional
adoption—and, especially, terminating parental rights—requires.21 What
guardianship does not do is give Terrence the legal identity as Darnell Jr.’s
parent; it would declare Darnell Jr.’s “Daddy” to be something other than a
parent.
Guardianship is sometimes seen as a less permanent option than
adoption and, for this reason, child welfare law prioritizes adoption over

18. Carol Sanger, Bargaining for Motherhood: Postadoption Visitation Agreements, 41
HOFSTRA L. REV. 309, 319 (2012). For an overview of state statutes, see CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., POSTADOPTION CONTACT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN BIRTH AND
ADOPTIVE
FAMILIES
(May
2011),
available
at
https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/cooperative.pdf
[hereinafter
POSTADOPTION CONTACT AGREEMENTS]. On the enforceability being subject to a child’s best interests,
see POSTADOPTION CONTACT AGREEMENTS at 4; D.C. CODE § 4-361(b)(1) (2001).
19. E.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2389(c) (2001).
20. Mark F. Testa, When Children Cannot Return Home: Adoption and Guardianship, 14 THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN 115, 121 (2004) [hereinafter Testa, When Children Cannot Return Home]; Meryl
Schwartz, Reinventing Guardianship: Subsidized Guardianship, Foster Care, and Child Welfare, 22
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 441, 476–77 (1996).
21. Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, How Much Does Legal Status Matter? Adoptions by
Kin Caregivers, 36 FAM. L.Q. 449, 466–67 (2002).
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guardianship.22 Indeed, guardianships can be terminated; if parents
rehabilitate, they can petition to terminate a guardianship.23 If they do so,
they may even enjoy a legal preference for parental custody.24 Guardians
can also ask that a child be returned to foster care if they feel that they can
no longer raise the child.25
Empirically, however, guardianships appear functionally as permanent
as adoptions. In a rigorous study with a large sample size and randomized
control and experimental groups, Mark Testa found that only 67 of 1,275
children living with guardians had a placement disruption or otherwise had
their guardianship terminated.26 Offering guardianship to families does not
affect the likelihood that a child’s placement with a family will disrupt
either while the child is formally a foster child or after a court enters a
guardianship or adoption order.27 Matching families in the experimental
group who chose guardianship to similar families in the control group who
pursued adoption, Testa found “no evidence of any adverse impact on the
long-term stability of the living arrangement” from guardianship.28 A
California study reported slightly larger, but still small levels of
guardianship disruptions—nothing to undermine the “substantially greater”
permanency rates that guardianship catalyzed.29
Under all three legal statuses—traditional adoption, adoption with
contact, and guardianship—Terrence will be Darnell Jr.’s primary and
permanent caretaker, and Tameka and Darnell Sr. may have some contact
22. Federal law requires states to rule out adoption before guardianship subsidies are available.
42 U.S.C. § 673(d)(3)(A)(ii) (2012). States have generally incorporated this requirement into their
guardianship laws or procedures. E.g., MO. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., CHILD WELFARE MANUAL § 4, ch.
22.2(2) (2013), available at http://www.dss.mo.gov/cd/info/cwmanual/section4/ch22/sec4ch22.pdf
(requiring that “[a]doption is not an option” for a guardianship to proceed).
23. E.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 475.083.2(3) (West 2009).
24. E.g., Tourison v. Pepper, 51 A.3d 470, 473 n.11 (Del. 2012); Troeskyn v. Herrington (In re
Guardianship of S.H.), 409 S.W.3d 07, 313–16 (Ark. 2012).
25. In many jurisdictions, any party—including the guardian—can move to terminate the
guardianship order. E.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2395(a) (2001).
26. MARK F. TESTA ET AL., UNIV. OF ILL. AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN & WESTAT, ILLINOIS
SUBSIDIZED GUARDIANSHIP WAIVER DEMONSTRATION: FINAL EVALUATION REPORT 50 (2003),
available
at
http://cfrc.illinois.edu/pubs/rp_20030701_
IllinoisSubsidizedGuardianshipWaiverDemonstrationFinalEvaluationReport.pdf.
27. Mark F. Testa, The Quality of Permanence—Lasting or Binding? Subsidized Guardianship
and Kinship Foster Care as Alternatives to Adoption, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 499, 526–27 (2005)
[hereinafter Testa, Quality of Permanence].
28. MARK F. TESTA, CHILDREN & FAMILY RESEARCH CTR., UNIV. OF ILL. AT URBANACHAMPAIGN, SUBSIDIZED GUARDIANSHIP: TESTING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS
FINALLY COME 23–24, 25 (2008), available
at http://www.nrcpfc.org/is/downloads/SG_
Testing%20Effectiveness%20(Testa%202008).pdf.
29. CAL. DEP’T OF SOC. SERVS., REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ON THE KINSHIP GUARDIANSHIP
ASSISTANCE PAYMENT (KIN-GAP) PROGRAM 5 (2005), [hereinafter CALIFORNIA KIN-GAP REPORT TO
THE LEGISLATURE]. The study found that 5.9 percent of children who left foster care to subsidized
guardianship subsequently re-entered foster care. The study cautioned that some of these re-entries
might be “positive”—such as a re-entry to facilitate reunification with a parent. Id. at 15.
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with the child. That multiple options exist—and specifically, options other
than traditional adoption with no contact rights—represents a significant
shift in child abuse and neglect law over the past generation, consistent
with Katharine Bartlett’s path-breaking call a generation ago for nonexclusive parenthood and subsequent commentary.30 Nonetheless, viewed
in terms of the legal title of “parent,” all of these options remain exclusive.
(California, through legislation enacted in October 2013, permits nonexclusive adoption and is thus the one state that permits an exception to this
proposition.31) For Terrence, the choice between adoption and guardianship
is a choice between becoming Darnell’s parent or his guardian. For Tameka
and Darnell Sr., adoption would be the end of their legal identity as
Darnell’s parents, while guardianship would maintain that identity. The
question of identity—who of these three adults can claim to be the child’s
legal parent—is important, and the legal options available to the parties
render the status of legal parent exclusive. In guardianships, the guardian is
explicitly not a parent; the biological parent(s) retains that status. In
adoptions (with or without contact rights), the adoptive parent(s) obtains
and the biological parent(s) loses that status.
III. NON-EXCLUSIVE ADOPTION’S SPECIAL BENEFITS IN CHILD WELFARE
CASES
This Article argues that child welfare law should permit a fourth
option—non-exclusive adoption, in which Terrence would adopt Darnell
Jr. without terminating Tameka and Darnell Sr.’s parental rights.
Recognizing all three adults as parents is valuable for multiple reasons.
First, normatively, the legal name attached to a particular status matters
significantly to the individuals involved. If, on the facts of a family’s case,
there are three (or four) parents and the parents agree to recognize each
other’s status, then the law ought to so recognize too. The legal name helps
establish individuals’ identities and shapes the relationship among all the
principals. Whether one can claim the legal title of “parent” is particularly
salient in the child welfare field, which has developed the permanency
options of adoption and guardianship to manage this precise issue. The
field’s experience with guardianship demonstrates the importance that
parties place on the legal title granted an adult caregiver.
Second, instrumentally, offering an option for non-exclusive adoption
can help more children leave foster care to permanent families, and to do so
30. See generally Bartlett, supra note 6. For examples of subsequent commentary, see Susan
Vivian Mangold, Extending Non-Exclusive Parenting and the Right to Protection for Older Foster
Children: Creating Third Options in Permanency Planning, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 835, 870–73 (2000);
Schwartz, supra note 20, at 451–61.
31. Infra notes 177–179 and accompanying text.

1 GUPTA-KAGAN 715-765 (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

Non-Exclusive Adoption and Child Welfare

4/1/2015 9:33 AM

725

through a legal status that best reflects their lives and imposes the least
harm by unnecessary litigation between the most important adults in their
lives.32 Again, the field’s experience with guardianship is instructive,
demonstrating that existing permanency options may force families into
less than ideal situations and prevent some children from leaving foster
care at all.
Third, permitting non-exclusive adoptions would also provide certain
other benefits to foster children that depend upon the parent–child
relationship. It would maintain their legal relationships with non-adopted
siblings and other extended family members through biological parents and
create such relationships through adoptive parents. Moreover, it would
maximize various other legal rights that spring from a parent–child
relationship.
A. Legal Names Matter
The terminology applied to a legal relationship—whether we call
Terrence “guardian” or “parent” and whether we call Tameka and Darnell
Sr. “parents” or remove that label—matters because it communicates
society’s view of the status of a relationship, and thus shapes the
understanding of a relationship both among the adults and the children
involved.33
Family law has recognized in multiple contexts that, as Clare
Huntington has put it, “[t]he names we use matter.”34 In describing what
relationship rights may exist between children and caregivers other than
biological or adoptive parents, commentators and law reform efforts have
adopted terms such as “functional” or “de facto parents” as a means of
granting a legal title of “parent” to third-party caregivers.35 Many states’
family law codes now provide for presumptions in favor of joint legal and
physical custody36—so even a parent who functionally only has visitation
32. Child advocates and the academy have long recognized the “jurogenic” harms to children of
litigation—defined as “harm to the child that flows from contact with the legal system.” Pamela Mohr,
Report of the Working Group on the Allocation of Decision Making, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1325, 1327
(1996).
33. David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the Constitutional Dilemma of the Faultless Father,
41 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 793 (1999).
34. Clare Huntington, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS
130 (2014).
35. See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles & Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Between Function and Form: Towards a
Differentiated Model of Functional Parenthood, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 419, 421, 422 n.10 (2013)
(arguing for the use of a term like “de facto parent” rather than “third party” for certain caregivers). The
American Law Institute has proposed the legal status of “de facto parent[]” and “parent[] by estoppel”
for some caregivers. Infra notes 150–156 and accompanying text.
36. E.g., D.C. CODE §§ 16-914(a)(1)(B)(ii) & 16-914(a)(2) (2001 & Supp. 2014) (defining
visitations rights as part of “physical custody” and establishing a presumption that “joint custody”
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rights is a “custodial parent” in the eyes of the law, and can identify as
such.
The importance of the name attached to a legal status is especially
evident in debates over same-sex marriage. A tenet of the argument that
states must legally recognize same-sex marriages is that granting same-sex
couples all rights held by opposite-sex married couples but denying the
same legal title (calling their relationship a civil union rather than a
marriage) unlawfully discriminates between the two groups. When the state
gives different names to different groups, the state suggests a hierarchy and
discrimination between the two.37 Providing the same legal name accords
equal “dignity and respect” to all parties.38 For children like Darnell Jr.,
legally recognizing three parents “legitimate[s] the lived experiences of the
children in question,”39 just as legally recognizing same-sex marriage
legitimates the experiences of committed same-sex couples. Absent
weighty countervailing considerations, the law should not impede
children’s ability to “understand the integrity and closeness of their own
family,”40 a principle which requires the law to recognize the lived realities
of children’s families.
Just as a legal hierarchy exists among adult relationships, with
marriage higher than civil unions or domestic partnerships, a legal
hierarchy exists among adult caregiver-child relationships, with parent
higher than guardian, and certainly higher than former parent or legal
serves children’s best interests). See also Huntington, supra note 34, at 130 (describing some states use
of “parenting time” to replace “custody” terminology).
37. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 400–01 (Cal. 2008).
38. Id. at 400. One year later, the California Supreme Court upheld Proposition 8’s ban on samesex marriage, explaining that it changed only “the official designation of the term ‘marriage’” without
“fundamentally alter[ing]” same-sex couples’ constitutional rights. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 61
(Cal. 2009) (emphases in original). The Court went on to reaffirm “the significance that the official
designation of ‘marriage’ holds” and describe it as a “vital factor” in its original decision in favor of
same-sex marriage. Id.
39. Appleton, supra note 2, at 68.
40. United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013). Justice Kennedy’s opinion striking
down the Defense of Marriage Act’s definition of marriage for federal law purposes also stated that
denying the marriage of a same-sex couple “humiliates” children raised by those couples. Id. Justice
Kennedy followed earlier marriage equality cases espousing similar logic. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of
Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 964 (Mass. 2003) (“Excluding same-sex couples from civil marriage
will . . . prevent children of same-sex couples from enjoying the immeasurable advantages that flow
from the assurance of a stable family structure . . . .”) (citation and quotation omitted); id. at 972
(Greaney, J., concurring) (prohibiting same-sex marriage “creat[es] a system in which children of samesex couples are unable to partake of legal protections and social benefits taken for granted by children
in families whose parents are of the opposite sex.”). See also Catherine E. Smith, Equal Protection for
Children of Same-Sex Parents, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1589 (2013) (arguing that same-sex marriage bans
harm children of same-sex couples by “depriving children of a legal relationship with both of their
parents”); Tanya Washington, What About the Children?: Child-Centered Challenges to Same-Sex
Marriage Bans, 12 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 1 (2012) (same). Post-Windsor marriage
equality cases have continued making the point. E.g., Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648,663–64 (7th Cir.
2014).
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stranger—what a biological parent becomes after termination. That
hierarchy is evident in child welfare law’s preference for adoption over
guardianship,41 and in the law’s privileging of parents over guardians in
guardianship modification fights.42 Thus, it should be no surprise if some
foster parents, like Terrence, seek the term “parent” that adoption provides
rather than “guardian,” and we should similarly expect parents like Tameka
and Darnell Sr. to want to maintain their legal title of parent by avoiding
termination of their rights.
The child welfare field’s experience with guardianship demonstrates
that this hierarchy is not monolithic—parties to a single case do not always
desire the same legal title. For instance, in many cases, it is important to
biological parents to not become a legal stranger to their child;43 for this
reason some parents are willing to consent to a guardianship petition but
not to an adoption petition (at least an adoption petition that would
terminate their parental rights).44 Some grandparents, aunts, uncles and
others raising children want to “retain their extended family identities”45
rather than become a “parent,” and becoming a guardian permits them to do
so. This does not mean that the name “parent” or “guardian” affects other
outcomes for children—Testa has shown that whether children were living
with adoptive parents or guardians did not affect their sense of belonging to
a family,46 or the stability of a child’s living arrangement; the quality of the
child’s relationship with the caregiver, and the degree of familial
relationship (prior to any legal change) were far more important.47
Whatever the precise legal title an individual desires, guardianship
shows that different family members do place importance on the name of a
legal relationship. Just as some families prefer the legal names accorded via
guardianship, it is not hard to imagine individuals like Terrence, Darnell
Sr., and Tameka preferring legal names that respect all three adults as
parents. Indeed, given the “powerful legacy” of the concept of
psychological parents throughout family law and especially in child welfare
law,48 we should expect that many long-term foster parents (both kinship
and not) who wish to make a permanent commitment to raise a child will
want to claim the legal title of parent. Absent data showing different
41. Supra note 22 and accompanying text. This hierarchy is subject to challenge. Supra notes
23–27 and accompanying text.
42. Supra note 15.
43. Sanger, supra note 18, at 321–22.
44. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 452–53 (describing situations in which a termination
triggered opposition and much litigation and delay by a parent who sought only visitation rights).
45. Testa, Quality of Permanence, supra note 27, at 505; Jesse L. Thornton, Special Report:
Permanency Planning for Children in Kinship Foster Homes, 70 CHILD WELFARE 593, 597 (1991).
46. Testa, Quality of Permanence, supra note 27, at 524–25.
47. Id. at 525.
48. Appleton, supra note 2, at 28.
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outcomes based on legal status, the law should defer to the preferences of
the individuals whose family relationships are at issue.49
Relatedly, the name of a legal relationship determines which adult can
name children. Naming a child is a core parental authority,50 so
determining who has authority regarding a name change is crucial. Names
are deeply personal, “arguably constitutive of our selves.”51 Children’s
names identify their legal relationships. Darnell Jr.’s first name reflects his
biological parentage—he carries his father’s first name, and his mother’s
choice to grant him that name.52 And his given last name is his mother’s,
identifying to the world the parent or parents to which that child is tied
socially and legally, and tells children who their parents are.53 The
importance of names to children’s identity is already part of family law:
adjudicating disputes between divorced parents about children’s names, at
least one state has emphasized how the current and proposed name affect a
child’s identity as core factors to consider.54 Exclusive adoption could
change this name; adoption, but not guardianship, generally provides a new
caregiver the authority to change the child’s name assigned by birth parents
at birth and even obtain a new birth certificate.55 If Terrence becomes
Darnell’s guardian, then Darnell’s last name will remain the same—a
testament to his ongoing parental relationship with Darnell Sr. and Tameka.

49. Testa, Quality of Permanence, supra note 27, at 531 (concluding “that the preferences of
children and kin” should shape decisions between adoption and guardianship).
50. See generally Carlton F.W. Larson, Naming Baby: The Constitutional Dimensions of
Parental Naming Rights, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 159 (2011).
51. Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of Marital
Names, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 763 (2007).
52. When a child is born to unmarried parents, Missouri law provides that the father’s name and
information will not be included on a birth certificate unless the father has signed an acknowledgment
of paternity or a court has entered an order declaring the child’s paternity. MO. ANN. STAT. § 193.085.7
(West 2011). These exceptions were not met in Darnell Jr.’s case, as Darnell Sr. was incarcerated at the
time of his birth, leaving Tameka as the only parent with authority to name him.
53. Emens writes that “naming regime . . . tells children about their selves and their parents.”
Supra note 51 at 785. That point is in reference to marital name conventions—specifically, husbands
not changing their names and wives often adopting their husbands’ names—on children, but surely
applies to adopted children’s names as well.
54. The South Carolina Supreme Court has listed nine factors to consider in such cases,
including “the effect of the [name] change on the preservation and development of the child’s
relationship with each parent; . . . the identification of the child as part of a family unit; . . . and the
possibility that the use of a different name will cause insecurity or a lack of identity.” Wilson v.
McDonald, 713 S.E.2d 306, 308 (S.C. 2011) (quotation and citation omitted). I thank Marcia Zug and
her student, Andrew Littlejohn Johnson, for noting this related naming issue.
55. E.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 453.100 (West 2014); UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 1-103 (1994).
Guardianship statutes lack similar provisions. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 475 (West 2009). Historically,
granting an adopted child a new birth certificate seeks to replicate a two biological parent norm for an
adopted child by printing a fictional document purporting to show that the child was born to the
adoptive parents. Annette R. Appell, Certifying Identity, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 361, 393. Such a legal
fiction would be pointless in a non-exclusive adoption scenario, as neither the family nor the state
would have any interest in hiding the child’s biological origins.
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If Terrence adopts, and does not terminate Darnell Sr. and Tameka’s rights,
then a name change could be permitted, especially if all three parents agree.
A last name blending Darnell’s birth name with Terrence’s last name might
be appropriate; any of the parents might insist on it as a condition of
agreeing to the non-exclusive adoption. If Darnell Jr. were older, he might
do so as well. Because a name that blends Terrence’s last name with
Darnell Jr.’s birth name communicates both that Terrence is now Darnell
Jr.’s parent, and that Tameka and Darnell Sr. remain his parents, nonexclusive adoption laws should presume that such a child has such a
blended name unless the parents consent otherwise.56
Just as children’s names can shape their identity, the names that
children use for adult caregivers reflect and shape those relationships.
Children often call caregivers other than biological parents “mom” or
“dad.”57 Darnell Jr. calls his foster parent “Daddy,” and his biological
parents “Mommy” and “Papa”—and he is one of many children I have
encountered in foster care who utilize such naming devices for their various
parent figures.
Darnell’s naming devices provide a shorthand illustration of why legal
titles should reflect the relationships between adults and children, even if it
requires recognizing more than two individuals as parents. This vertical
focus between generations differs from family law’s frequent focus on
horizontal relationships, especially marriage or marriage-like relationships
between adults.58 The general rule is that absent “the functional equivalent
of the traditional husband-wife relationship,” two people cannot become
parents to the same child via adoption.59 That is, courts will dismiss
adoption petitions due to the absence of a marriage-like relationship
between petitioners without any consideration of the relationship between
those petitioners and the child.60 But respecting the lived experiences of
foster children requires a vertical focus. Foster children by definition have
biological parents—from whom the state removed them and with whom
they often maintain strong relationships—and foster parents—who provide
56. Cf. Emens, supra note 51, at 859–61 (proposing a default rule of hyphenating spouses’
names at marriage).
57. E.g., Sacha M. Coupet, Neither Dyad nor Triad: Children’s Relationship Interests Within
Kinship Caregiving Families, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 77, 79 (2007) (describing such a situation).
58. I borrow Sacha Coupet’s horizontal and vertical terminology, based on “how the family
structure would be depicted within a family tree. A mother or father’s spouse, quasi-spouse, or
prescribed mating partner would be connected to her/him along a horizontal axis . . . . By contrast, a
mother or father’s ancestors . . . would be aligned vertically . . . .” Sacha M. Coupet, “Ain’t I A
Parent?”: The Exclusion of Kinship Caregivers from the Debate over Expansions of Parenthood, 34
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 595, 601 n.10 (2010).
59. In re Adoption of Garrett, 841 N.Y.S.2d 731, 732 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2007).
60. See, e.g., id. (dismissing adoption petition filed by biological mother and her sibling without
any discussion of the sibling’s relationship with the child, other than a note that the mother, her sibling,
and her child had been living together for “only” several months).
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day-to-day care and often permanent homes.61 Biological and foster parents
will not have a marriage or marriage-like relationship, but this is of no
relevance to the real relationships that children have with both of them. The
names that the law applies to both categories of adults should, therefore,
follow a vertical focus.
Across history and various cultures, legal construction of parentage has
been about constructing children’s legal identity.62 The law’s establishment
of relationships between certain adults and children “is both an active agent
in prescribing, proscribing, and attributing identity, and a public medium
for choosing and enacting it.”63 Biological parent–child relationships hold a
privileged place in our law and culture, and, as a result, play a powerful
role in shaping individual identity, as many commentators have explored.64
This norm is globally accepted; international law connects a child’s family
relationships to a child’s right “to preserve his or her identity.”65
Consistent with that principle, empirical studies show both that foster
children’s ongoing relationships with their biological parents are important
and often beneficial, and that terminating these relationships can be
harmful. Ongoing relationships with biological parents and other family
members is quite common, even when the child welfare system has deemed
parents too problematic to ever reunify with their children during their
childhoods. One study found 39% of all children adopted from foster
care—whose parents’ rights were therefore terminated—lived with
adoptive parents who had agreements to ensure ongoing post-adoption
contact with biological family members.66 The growth of both informal and
formal open adoption testifies to that fact.67 Lawyers assigned to represent
children have reported their clients’ ongoing relationships with their
parents, even after long court-mandated separations.68 Ongoing contact
with biological parents is so frequent that states have begun enacting
61. For a philosophical argument that day to day care should establish parental rights, see
JONATHAN HERRING, CARING AND THE LAW 199–203 (2013).
62. June Carbone, The Legal Definition of Parenthood: Uncertainty at the Core of Family
Identity, 65 LA. L. REV. 1295, 1332–34 (2005).
63. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Are You My Mother?”: Conceptualizing Children’s Identity
Rights in Transracial Adoptions, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 107, 111 (1995). See also Clare
Huntington, Staging the Family, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 591–92 (2013) (noting how the law’s
definition of who is a parent will “often shape[] public images created through performance” of family
roles).
64. E.g., Annette Ruth Appell, The Myth of Separation, 6 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 291, 292–97
(2011) (discussing biological connections’ value and collecting sources).
65. Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 8, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
66. SHARON VANDIVERE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADOPTION U.S.A.: A
CHARTBOOK BASED ON THE 2007 NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADOPTIVE PARENTS 45 (2009), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/09/NSAP/chartbook/index.pdf. Significantly more children adopted are outside
of foster care. Id. at 3.
67. See Appell, supra note 64, at 295 (describing growth of open adoption).
68. E.g., id. at 293.
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statutes to permit re-establishment of parental rights after supposedly
permanent termination of parental rights orders are entered.69
Ongoing contact is particularly common among children who grow up
in foster care, and only leave when they emancipate at age 18 or 21. A
study of former foster youth who grew up in foster care after spending
some significant time with their biological families showed that they
maintained a “very close” or “somewhat close” relationship with their
mothers—27% and 25%, respectively.70 These are strikingly high numbers
for parents who the child welfare system deemed too unfit to reunify at any
point during their children’s childhood.
Conversely, terminating parents’ rights to their children—and thus
terminating the legal relationship between parents and children—can have
negative consequences when children have ongoing relationships with their
parents. Such terminations are “upsetting” to children, and are a “loss” to
be “cop[ed] with,” not a neutral legal action.71 Terminations can cause
children to grieve and can injure their self-esteem, while maintaining
parent–child relationships can prevent or mitigate these harms.72
Terminating biological parent–child relationships can harm children’s
developing sense of identity, and even cause some children to develop
behavior problems which threaten adoptive families.73 And foster children,
especially older foster children, often express hesitation about adoption
because they seek to maintain strong connections with their biological
family members, or because they retain hope of living with a biological
parent, even a parent with whom they have never lived.74
69. Richard Barth, Adoption from Foster Care: A Chronicle of the Years After ASFA, in
INTENTIONS AND RESULTS: A LOOK BACK AT THE ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT 64, 65–66
(2009), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1001351_safe_families_act.pdf; LaShanda
Taylor, Resurrecting Parents of Legal Orphans: Un-terminating Parental Rights, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y
& L. 318 (2010)
70. MARK E. COURTNEY ET AL., CHAPIN HALL AT UNIV. OF CHI., MIDWEST EVALUATION OF THE
ADULT FUNCTIONING OF FORMER FOSTER YOUTH: OUTCOMES AT AGE 26, at 14 (2011), available at
http://www.chapinhall.org/sites/default/files/Midwest%20Evaluation_Report_4_10_12.pdf. This study
focused on youth who entered before turning 16 and were still in foster care at 17, and thus lacked a
new permanent family, and likely spent some significant time living with their biological families
before entering foster care. Id. at 3.
71. See Kerri M. Schneider & Vicky Phares, Coping with Parental Loss Because of Termination
of Parental Rights, 84 CHILD WELFARE 819, 838 (2005).
72. Matthew B. Johnson, Examining Risks to Children in the Context of Parental Rights
Termination Proceedings, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 397, 414 (1997).
73. Margaret Beyer & Wallace J. Mlyniec, Lifelines to Biological Parents: Their Effect on
Termination of Parental Rights and Permanence, 20 FAM. L.Q. 233, 238 (1986).
74. For example, Davion Only—the Florida teenager who gained national attention when he
publicly requested to be adopted, infra note 78 and accompanying text—only sought adoption after his
biological mother died and he could “let go of the hope that she would come get him.” Lane
DeGregory, Amid Churchgoers, Orphan Davion Only Pleads for a Family, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Oct. 7
2013,
http://www.tampabay.com/features/humaninterest/amid-churchgoers-orphan-pleads-for-afamily/2145907. This loyalty to a biological parent existed even for a teenager who had been in foster
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When meaningful parent–child relationships continue, even when
parents are too unfit to have custody, then the legal relationship between
parent and child continues to have significant value. The child welfare field
has already adopted that position by using guardianship as a frequent path
to legal permanency; a core purpose of guardianship is to maintain the legal
name of “parent” and thus protect the legal relationship between a child
and unfit parent. Guardianship permits children to know that their parent
retains the legal identity of parent—a factor important to some children.75
At the same time, we should expect that many foster children, who
studies have shown are often quite attuned to the legal status of their
primary relationships, will want a primary caregiving foster parent to
become a legal parent.76 Anecdotally, consider the statement of one former
foster youth critiquing her former foster parents, who “loved us [and]
wanted to keep us,” but who “felt that was enough” and saw adoption as “a
bureaucratic step up from foster care with no deep meaning in and of itself.
For me, nothing could have been further from the truth.”77 Other foster
children’s pleas for a legal parent have garnered significant publicity: one
foster youth created a media storm when he made a plea for an adoptive
family at church.78 In some cases, this desire will far outweigh the value of
an ongoing relationship with biological parents, making exclusive adoption
appropriate. In other cases, foster children will have a strong connection
with and identity from their biological parent, and a non-parent relationship
with a foster parent, making guardianship most appropriate. And in yet
other cases, like Darnell’s, children will wish for three legal parents. In all
such situations, the legal titles accorded to the adults in a child’s life are of
significant importance.
B. Offering More Permanency Options Can Help More Children Leave
Foster Care to Permanent Families
When a foster child cannot reunify with either parent, child welfare law
seeks to help that child leave foster care for a new, permanent family.
Indeed, much of child welfare law involves procedures for determining if
reunification is possible and if not, how to help a child leave foster care as
soon as possible. Making non-exclusive adoption a permanency option can
care since birth and thus had never lived with his mother. Id. This phenomenon is common enough for
practitioner guides to address it directly. E.g., Gerald P. Mallon et al., Adolescents’ Conflicting Feelings
About Permanency, in ACHIEVING PERMANENCY FOR ADOLESCENTS IN FOSTER CARE: A GUIDE FOR
LEGAL PROFESSIONALS 45, 55 (Claire Sandt Chiamulera & Sally Small Inada eds., 2006).
75. Testa, Quality of Permanence, supra note 27, at 510.
76. Meyer, supra, note 33, at 811–12.
77. Goodwin & Duke, supra note 12, at 1368 (quoting Charlotte Lopez).
78. DeGregory, supra note 74.
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help achieve this goal by providing a path out of foster care that currently
does not exist. Moreover, it provides foster children and their families with
a better option for leaving foster care and makes the process of leaving
foster care faster and less conflicted—especially if litigation can be
avoided.
1. Guardianship’s Lessons
The child welfare field’s experience with guardianship demonstrates
the value of offering multiple permanency options to families. First, the
experience of guardianship in expanding permanency and the large number
of children who still grow up in foster care suggest the value of exploring
further permanency options that may help more children leave foster care
for permanent families. Guardianship has proven its ability to help many
more children leave foster care. In a controlled experiment in Illinois,
offering guardianship as an option increased permanency rates by 5.5%,
substantially increasing the number of children who left foster care for
permanent families because guardianship was an option.79 Controlled
experiments in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and in Tennessee found even
greater increases—offering subsidized guardianship increased the number
of children who left foster care for permanent families by 19.9% and
12.8%, respectively.80 Less rigorous studies of other jurisdictions found
similar or greater increases in permanency rates after guardianship was
introduced.81 The number of affected children is much larger beyond that
experimental group: nationally, as guardianship has become used more
frequently, more than 15,000 children leave foster care to guardianship
annually (a roughly threefold increase since the 1990s),82 while the overall

79. Of experimental group children, 88.6% left foster care to a permanent home versus 83.1% of
control group children. Mark F. Testa, Evaluation of Child Welfare Interventions, in FOSTERING
ACCOUNTABILITY: USING EVIDENCE TO GUIDE AND IMPROVE CHILD WELFARE POLICY 195, 199 (Mark
F. Testa & John Poertner eds., 2010).
80. Testa, supra note 28, at 10 (finding 19.9% increase in permanency in Milwaukee and 12.8%
increase in Tennessee).
81. E.g., CALIFORNIA KIN-GAP REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, supra note 29, at 5; CAROLINE
DANIELSON & HELEN LEE, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL., FOSTER CARE IN CALIFORNIA: ACHIEVEMENTS
AND CHALLENGES 10 (2013) (finding that about 30,000 children left foster care to subsidized
guardianship over a decade, contributing 20–50% of California’s reduction in the foster care
population).
82. For the most recent numbers of guardianships, see U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, CHILDREN’S BUREAU, THE AFCARS REPORT: PRELIMINARY FY
2013
ESTIMATES
AS
OF
JULY
2014,
at
3
(2014),
available
at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/afcarsreport21.pdf [hereinafter AFCARS]. Testa reports
the dramatic increase in the number of guardianships nationally—from 5,836 in fiscal year 1998 to
more than 10,000 in fiscal year 2000. Testa, When Children Cannot Return Home, supra note 20, at 121
& 127 n.29.
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number of adoptions has remained steady at around 50,000 annually.83
Still, thousands more children remain in foster care, unlikely to reunify
with their parents and in need of some legal path to permanency. The
federal government counts more than 100,000 children who remain in
foster care “waiting” for a permanent family.84 That figure excludes
roughly 20,000 older teenagers with a case goal of “emancipation”—that
is, those who grow up in foster care, raised by the state.85
Second, only offering adoption pushes families to pursue adoption
when they would have preferred guardianship. The longest study—which
followed families for ten years—showed that for nearly 15% of families,
offering more options led them to choose a permanency option other than
traditional, exclusive adoption. In the control group—in which a foster or
kinship family could only choose adoption—74.9% of children were
adopted.86 But in the experimental group—in which families could choose
either adoption or guardianship—only 60.2% of children were adopted.87
One can infer that the converse is also true: providing fewer options pushes
families into a legal option that they considered inferior—exclusive
adoption.
The first effect of guardianship is widely viewed as good; helping
children leave the impermanence of foster care and enter a permanent
family is a central tenet of child welfare law and practice.88 The second
phenomenon is also good; if there is little difference in the outcomes for
children,89 then respecting the dignity of all individuals in these
emotionally fraught cases requires respecting their choices among legal
options.
Although non-exclusive adoption has not been subject to empirical
study (and cannot be until it is offered as a permanency option), we should
83. In fiscal year 2013, 50,281 children left foster care to adoption. AFCARS, supra note 82, at
3. The annual number of adoptions spiked from roughly 25,000 in the 1990s to about 50,000 in the
early 2000s and have remained roughly steady since. Barth, supra note 68, at 65.
84. AFCARS, supra note 82, at 4.
85. Id. at 4 n.3.
86. Testa supra note 79, at 204. See also Testa, Quality of Permanence, supra note 27, at 519–
20.
87. Testa, supra note 79, at 204. Controlled experiments of other jurisdictions found conflicting
results. Tennessee saw an even greater impact than Illinois, with 24.6% fewer adoptions in the group of
families for whom guardianship was an option. Id. In Milwaukee, Wisconsin, the group offered
guardianship had 2.4% more adoptions. Id. Though more study is warranted, three factors support a
tentative conclusion that offering guardianship does displace some adoptions: the study that tracked
families for the longest period of time (Illinois) found this result; two out of three states found this
result; and these two states found a particularly large effect. Finally, the one jurisdiction that did not
find this result did not offer guardianship to families already moving towards adoption—thus depriving
those families of the information necessary to pursue a substitution effect. Testa, supra note 28, at 20.
88. See, e.g., Goodwin & Duke, supra note 12, at 1363–65 (reciting bad life outcomes for youth
who remain in foster care until they become adults).
89. Testa, Quality of Permanence, supra notes 46–47, and accompanying text.
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expect modest but analogous results. Some families like Darnell’s may
prefer some option other than traditional adoption or guardianship and,
under existing law, would be forced into a non-ideal option. Other such
families may delay or resist seeking a non-ideal legal permanency option,
leaving children to linger unnecessarily in foster care. A foster parent like
Terrence might be both unwilling to seek exclusive adoption and thus
terminate biological parents’ rights and also unwilling to become a
guardian because he sees himself as a parent. A foster care agency might
reasonably resist pursuing termination litigation without the foster parent’s
commitment to file for adoption or out of respect for the child’s remaining
bond with a parent, while guardianship litigation could not commence
without a foster parent willing to become a guardian; children would thus
remain in foster care. The foster care agency might also reasonably wonder
if it could meet its burden of proving that an involved biological parent is
unfit and that the child’s best interests require terminating the involved
parent’s rights. The real-life case on which I have based Darnell’s fact
pattern remained open for multiple years, likely through a combination of
the above factors.90 Offering non-exclusive adoption as an option would
help foster and biological parents reach an agreement, which, at the very
least, would lead to faster permanency for children and prevent some from
remaining in foster care for years.
2. More Options Can Avoid Unnecessary and Harmful Litigation
Negotiating between permanency options can be analogized to plea
bargaining.91 Under existing law, parents can agree to give up their right to
a trial to defend their parental rights and rights to future custody, in
exchange for adoptive parents agreeing to a post-adoption contact
agreement or the state and foster parents seeking guardianship rather than a
termination of parental rights through adoption. Such negotiated
solutions—while fraught with many of the same challenges of criminal
plea bargaining92—can serve important instrumental goals. In cases like
Darnell’s, those goals include avoiding unnecessary litigation over
Darnell’s permanency arrangement—especially when such litigation would
pit biological parents against foster parents, and particularly if those foster
parents and biological parents (like Terrence and Tameka) have a personal
relationship that pre-dates the child’s foster care placement. Such litigation

90. I say “likely” because I cannot speak authoritatively regarding the motivation for clients I did
not represent, including the state and the foster parent.
91. Sanger, supra note 18, at 331–39.
92. Id.
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imposes stress on all parties, is quite lengthy, is inherently adversarial,93
and the field has long recognized the risks inherent in it.94 Such litigation is
also costly to the state, which must pay court costs, lawyers’ fees, and bear
the costs of foster care during the pendency of the litigation.95 Most
importantly, litigation between Terrence, Tameka, and Darnell Sr. threatens
Darnell Jr.’s well-being; all three adults have important relationships with
him and should continue those relationships after the legal status is
determined. The prospect of litigation threatens the relationship between
the adults and thus threatens Darnell’s ability to maintain a relationship
with all of them.96 Avoiding litigation and the emotional scars it can cause
is an important goal, and a core reason for developing options such as
guardianship, which is attractive to family members who want to avoid
fighting with each other.97
Offering non-exclusive adoption as an additional permanency option
can similarly avoid unnecessary litigation in some cases by increasing the
opportunities for biological parents and foster parents to agree on a legal
permanency option. This point treats the permanency options
instrumentally: permanency options that help children leave foster care
faster, with less discord, and toward more stability between the adults who
will have relationships that last well beyond the litigation are valuable
because they lead to better results than ongoing foster care and continued
litigation. Although some have described such agreements as “coerced”
because of the state’s essential role,98 they come only after child protection
agencies have removed children, courts have found that parents are unfit,
and courts have subsequently found that children cannot reunify—usually
repeatedly over some significant period of time—and that an alternative
form of legal permanency would best serve the children’s interests. The
importance of making these decisions correctly cannot be overstated, and
the risk of error should not be discounted.99

93. Coupet, supra note 58, at 609.
94. E.g., Mark Hardin, Legal Placement Options to Achieve Permanence for Children in Foster
Care, in FOSTER CHILDREN IN THE COURTS 128, 134 (Mark Hardin ed., 1983) (describing how a
“drawn-out legal battle can heighten tension within the child’s foster home,” induce anxiety in children,
and implicitly pressure children to choose sides between biological and foster parents).
95. Sanger, supra note 18, at 334 (citing DEP’T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS., FISCAL AND POLICY
NOTE: REVISED, S. 710, 2005 Sess., at 5 (Md. 2005)).
96. This concern applies to family law more generally. See Rebecca Aviel, Why Civil Gideon
Won’t Fix Family Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2106, 2116 (2013).
97. Testa, Quality of Permanence, supra note 27, at 510–11.
98. Hilary Baldwin, Termination of Parental Rights: Statistical Study and Proposed Solutions,
28 J. LEGIS. 239, 274 (2002).
99. I have elsewhere criticized existing child welfare procedures for increasing the risk of error.
Josh Gupta-Kagan, Filling the Due Process Donut Hole: Abuse and Neglect Cases Between Disposition
and Permanency, 10 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 13, 38 (2011).
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Nonetheless, analyzing decisions at this juncture of a child welfare case
requires acknowledging the long path that the case has already taken. In
these cases, the odds of a child reunifying are relatively low and discussing
alternative permanency options merely recognizes reality rather than
imposes undue coercion. Finding a means for children in this category of
cases to leave foster care to permanent families is an essential goal, and
providing something to bargain over can induce agreed-upon solutions.100
And given the scope of our child welfare system—in which about 85,000
children leave foster care annually to live with adoptive parents, guardians,
or other relatives,101 and in which more than 100,000 children are “waiting”
for a new permanent family102—this normative value is particularly
significant, easily affecting hundreds or thousands of children annually.
Offering this option may accommodate the interests of all parties, and
is thus consistent with negotiation theory.103 Terrence is interested in
obtaining the legal status of a parent and legal custody of Darnell Jr.
Tameka and Darnell Sr. are interested in retaining their legal status as
parents and maintaining a right to visit Darnell Jr. Darnell Jr. has an interest
in leaving foster care and having a stable and permanent legal connection.
The state is interested in closing the case (which will save it money and
permit its caseworker to turn her attention to other cases) and ensuring that
it closes to permanency, without a significant risk of turning into a foster
care case again. Non-exclusive adoption satisfies all of these interests and
is thus consistent with interest-based or problem-solving negotiation
theory. It expands the pie of parental status and parental authority as a
means of helping parties agree on how to divide it up.104 Current law limits
the number of people who can claim the legal title of parent; in child
welfare cases only the biological parents or new caregivers can claim that
title.105 If both sides want it, then current law requires one to win and one to
lose—a scenario which can prevent negotiated agreement and lead to
litigation that will be stressful for all parties. That stress may cause overt
harm to the child or other parties. With non-exclusive adoption as an
option, the legal title of parent is not something that only one side can
claim. Expanding the pie in this manner may dilute the value of each
proverbial slice of the pie—there is, after all, only one child, and permitting
100. See Baldwin, supra note 98, at 274–75 (describing parents who consent to an adoption
because that is the only means to negotiate post-adoption contact).
101. For fiscal year 2013, the federal government reported 50,281 children leaving foster care for
adoption, 19,385 to “liv[e] with other relative(s)”—via an unclear legal status—and 17,664 to
guardianship. AFCARS, supra note 82, at 3.
102. Id. at 4.
103. ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN
42–57 (3d ed. 2011).
104. Id. at 58 (describing a successful negotiator: “He expands the pie before dividing it.”).
105. See Bartlett, supra note 6, at 881–82.
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more than two parents may dilute the authority each parent holds over the
child. Such dilution, however, has already occurred in child welfare, and is
an accepted and well-functioning feature of the law governing
guardianships of foster children.
Adoptive parents may have another legitimate reason to oppose nonexclusive adoption (just as foster parents may have legitimate reasons for
favoring adoption over guardianship); avoiding the risk of future
interference in their custodial decisions by biological parents. In the
aggregate, the stability of guardianships suggests that this risk is slight. But
it certainly exists in individual cases. If non-exclusive adoptions were
possible, adoptive parents should consider whether the cost of a trial
outweighs the risk of future interference. A negotiated settlement is
certainly not always appropriate—the risk of future interference may make
adoptive parents seek an exclusive adoption. Some parents are so harmful
to the child that they should be entirely cut off and lose the legal title
“parent.” Similarly, some children should reunify with their parents and no
adoption or guardianship should occur. In other cases, however, offering
non-exclusive adoption as an option can help provide the options necessary
to obtain a negotiated settlement that will more promptly and less
litigiously lead to permanency for children, consistent with an arrangement
developed by family members rather than judges.
C. Maintaining Legal Relationship with Siblings and Other Extended
Family Members
Like guardianship and unlike traditional adoption, non-exclusive
adoption would offer children the benefit of maintaining their legal
relationship with siblings and other extended family members. As a
corollary to the rule providing that adoption generally terminates the legal
relationship between children and parents, adoption typically cuts off
children’s legal relationships with their siblings and other relatives.
Some jurisdictions provide for such severance explicitly.106 Indeed, that
rule is hornbook law: “An adoption decree terminates or ‘cuts off’ the legal
relationship between the adoptee and all biological relatives and replaces it
with ties to the adoptive family.”107 By maintaining the legal relationship
between the child and biological parents, non-exclusive adoption would
also maintain the child’s legal relationships with other family members.
106. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-312(a) (2001) (providing that adoption shall “cut off” all “rights
and duties” between a child and “his natural parents, their issue, collateral relatives, and so forth”).
107.
SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON & D. KELLY WEISBERG, ADOPTION AND ASSISTED
REPRODUCTION: FAMILIES UNDER CONSTRUCTION 176 (2009). See also Jill Elaine Hasday, Siblings in
Law, 65 VAND. L. REV. 897, 908 (2012) (describing cases deeming a child’s ties to siblings as
“completely severed” after an adoption).
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Maintaining sibling relationships is important as a general matter;
siblings are the only individuals that most people know from birth to death,
and social science evidence describes the importance of sibling bonds.108
Sibling relationships are even more important in child welfare cases, in
which children have often endured the same or similar abuse and form
particularly close relationships with each other in the absence of stable
parental relationships.109 Youth who grew up in foster care have been found
to maintain particularly strong connections with siblings.110 And the loss of
sibling relationships that occurs after many foster care adoptions is
described by both adopted and un-adopted siblings as a significant
emotional harm.111
Some state courts have recognized the importance of sibling bonds and
ruled that children’s legal relationships to siblings and extended family
members continue even after one child is adopted, at least in the foster care
context. These cases apply statutory preferences for siblings removed from
parents to be placed together112 and for sibling visitation113 to situations in
which the legal relationship between at least one sibling and his parent has
been terminated. Similarly, at least one state supreme court has applied
kinship placement preference to any person related by blood to a child—
even if a court decision has severed the child’s legal relationship to a
parent.114
But those cases are the exception. As Jill Hasday has documented, the
norm remains for adoption to terminate sibling relationships, with siblings
losing a legal and often a social connection to each other when one is
adopted, with no generally recognized right of children to maintain contact
with siblings.115 And a review of federal child welfare law illustrates the
weakness of existing law in protecting sibling relationships. Federal law
expresses a preference for child welfare agencies to place siblings in the
same home, but requires only “reasonable efforts” to do so.116 Moreover, it
is not clear whether this federal provision applies to siblings after one has
been adopted. Neither the federal statute nor regulations define the term
“sibling.”117 Federal guidance give states flexibility to define sibling,
meaning states are free to decline to apply the sibling preference after an
108. Hasday, supra note 107, at 899–902 (summarizing research).
109. See id. at 901.
110. COURTNEY ET AL., supra note 70, at 14.
111. Hasday, supra note 107, at 903–05.
112. In re Carol B., 550 S.E.2d 636, 642 (W. Va. 2001).
113. Imperial Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Catherine A (In re Miguel A.), 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 307,
309 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
114. In re Adoption of J.E.F., 902 A.2d 402, 419 (Pa. 2006).
115. Hasday, supra note 107, at 903–12.
116. 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(31) (2012); Hasday, supra note 107, at 906.
117. 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(31); 45 C.F.R. § 1355.20 (2013).
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adoption occurs.118 State law on the subject is “sparse,” suggesting states
have largely not considered the issue, and what does exist varies
significantly.119
D. Maintaining Miscellaneous Rights and Duties that Depend on the
Parent–Child Relationship
A full accounting of the legal rights that depend on a parent–child
relationship is well beyond this Article. Two examples suffice to illustrate
the wide and lifelong scope of those relationships. First, consider
inheritance rights. Generally, severing a parent–child relationship ends the
child’s right to inherit from their parents, including the right to obtain
Social Security survivors’ benefits. Severing that relationship also
generally ends children’s right to inherit from other family members.120
Similarly, severing a parent–child relationship eliminates any ability for a
child to recover in tort for the wrongful death of their parent or siblings to
whom they are related through that parent.121
Second, consider employment-related rights that stem from a parent–
child relationship. Suppose that, in ten years, Darnell Jr. develops a serious
health problem and Tameka wishes to take off of work for a month to help
Terrence take care of him. Or in thirty or forty years Tameka is ailing and
Darnell Jr. wishes to take off of work to help her. The Family and Medical
Leave Act permits family leave to take care of a spouse, child, or parent—
but nobody else.122 Darnell and Tameka’s ability to take this leave depends
on legal recognition of their parent–child relationship.
Some scholars have argued forcefully for expanding the type of family
relationships that trigger legal rights to better account for the multitude of
close family relationships that exist.123 However, the existing practice of
limiting rights to certain relationships—especially spousal or domestic
partner relationships, and parent–child relationships—has the value of
applying reasonably clear lines and thus reducing uncertainty and litigation,
and policymakers have shown little appetite for adding new categories of
relationships. Accordingly, reforming definitions of existing
relationships—especially the parent–child relationship—is the most likely

118. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ACYF0CBPI-10-11, PROGRAM INSTRUCTION: GUIDANCE ON FOSTERING CONNECTIONS TO SUCCESS AND
INCREASING ADOPTIONS ACT OF 2008, at 22 (2010).
119. Hasday, supra note 107, at 907, 923.
120. In re Accounting by Fleet Bank, 884 N.E.2d 1040, 1044 (N.Y. 2008).
121. See Smith, supra note 40, at 1605.
122. Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C.A. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (2012).
123. E.g., Hasday, supra note 107; Coupet, supra note 58.
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method of preserving the rights that spring from a parent–child
relationship.
IV. CHILD WELFARE CASES CAN RESOLVE CONCERNS THAT MULTIPLE
PARENTHOOD RAISES
Non-exclusive adoption challenges two norms in family law: that no
more than two people can be parents at any time, and that parenthood is
defined by relationships between adults (traditionally, that the parents
could conceive a baby through heterosexual sex, and now expanding to
include parents involved in a marriage or marriage-like relationship
regardless of sexual orientation or biological parenthood). The challenge to
the first norm is obvious in how I have constructed Darnell’s
hypothetical—an adoption by Terrence without terminating biological
parents’ rights would identify three legal parents of Darnell. The challenge
to the second norm exists regardless of the number of parents. Even if, for
instance, Darnell Sr. relinquished his parental rights or died, Terrence could
not adopt without terminating Tameka’s rights because Terrence and
Tameka do not have a marriage or marriage-like relationship.124 This norm
reflects the “continued assumption that sexual relationships between adults
are relevant to parenting.”125 This norm may be weakening somewhat—a
recent case approved the adoption by two friends who lived apart and who
had no romantic or sexual relationship.126 But this ruling required holding
that the two friends were “intimate partners,” and, indeed, they co-parented
the child and worked together intimately.127 This logic would likely not
apply to Darnell Jr.’s case because Terrence and Tameka do not and would
not share the day-to-day details of parenting as the co-parenting friends do.
These norms have been challenged in recent years as ART and samesex parenting have grown in frequency and in social and legal acceptance.
Academics and a few courts and legislators have argued for recognition of
more than two parents as a means of recognizing all the adults with a core
parenting relationship with children.128 The existing discourse reflects the

124. If they petitioned to adopt jointly, a court would likely rule as a New York court did when a
mother’s adult sibling sought to adopt the child with her—without “the functional equivalent of the
traditional husband-wife relationship,” two people cannot become parents to the same child via
adoption. In re Adoption of Garrett, 841 N.Y.S.2d 731, 732 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2007).
125. Suzanne A. Kim, The Neutered Parent, 24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 57 (2012).
126. In re Adoption of G., 978 N.Y.S.2d 622 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2013).
127. Id. at 626–29.
128. See Nancy E. Dowd, Multiple Parents/Multiple Fathers, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 231, 232
(2007); Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two? Disaggregating Traditional Parental Rights and
Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 309, 338–39 (2007); Yehezkel
Margalit et al., The New Frontier of Advanced Reproductive Technology: Reevaluating Modern Legal
Parenthood, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 107, 133 (2014).
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concern that identifying more than two parents will increase the possibility
of conflict among the adults that will harm children. The discourse has also
focused on private family law, especially cases involving ART and samesex couples, generally excluding child welfare.
This Part will analyze those efforts and criticisms of them, and argue
that child welfare cases like Darnell’s present stronger examples for
recognizing more than two parents, including those who do not have a
sexual relationship. Child welfare law already recognizes that the
relationship between adults and children matters most—not the relationship
among adults. The child welfare field has ready responses for concerns
raised regarding recognition of multiple parents—child welfare has already
recognized more than two parent-like figures and allocated authority
among them effectively—that is precisely what occurs in guardianships,
with the core difference being the legal name attached to the status.
The conversation regarding multiple parents should expand beyond
ART cases and include child welfare for several reasons. The former attract
attention because of the contentious nature of ART, especially when
applied to same-sex parenting. Children and families involved in child
welfare cases are, of course, equally worthy of attention.129 Their numbers
are significant, with about 87,000 children annually leaving foster care to
live with adoptive parents, guardians, or to otherwise live with relatives,
with many more lingering in foster care until child welfare agencies can
identify prospective adoptive parents or guardians.130 Broadening the
conversation also serves goals of class and racial equality. ART cases,
almost by definition, involve families with significant means because ART
costs significant sums,131 so limiting multiple parenthood law to ART cases
unjustifiably creates “middle class family law,” rather than applying legal
principles more equally.132 Child welfare cases, by contrast, involve
129. I do not accuse anyone of suggesting otherwise. Rather, I am only observing that the bulk of
writing about multiple parenthood has focused on ART and not child welfare cases. A notable
exception, Sacha M. Coupet’s “Ain’t I A Parent?”: The Exclusion of Kinship Caregivers from the
Debate over Expansions of Parenthood, supra note 58, focuses on adults caring for extended family
member children but does not focus directly on foster care cases. Michele Goodwin and Naomi Duke
have focused on child welfare cases, emphasizing the need for more parents for foster children who
would otherwise grow up in state custody, and proposing a means for a group of adults other than
biological parents to form “parent civil unions.” See Goodwin & Duke, supra note 12, at 1375
(describing “parent civil union” examples which exclude biological parents). A clear focus on the
common fact pattern like Darnell Jr.’s in which children are primarily cared for by foster parents while
maintaining a strong relationship with at least one biological parent remains lacking in the literature.
130. AFCARS, supra note 82, at 3.
131. See Cahn, supra note 4, at 379 (noting the correlation between women’s class and access to
assisted reproductive technology).
132. See JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND
THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 2 (2011) (distinguishing “middle-class family law” from poor
people’s family law); Jill Elaine Hasday, Parenthood Divided: A Legal History of the Bifurcated Law of
Parental Relations, 90 GEO. L.J. 299 (2002).
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families facing significant poverty. Federal data shows that children in
impoverished families face significantly more abuse and neglect.133 And
the financial concerns of foster families (especially kinship foster families)
are so great that state and federal governments offer subsidies to adoptive
parents and guardians to help them with the cost of raising foster children,
and to incentivize foster parents to become adoptive parents or
guardians.134 Child welfare cases also involve disproportionately high
numbers of black and Latino children,135 and the problem of youth who
remain in foster care without a permanent family is disproportionately
found among black and Latino children.136
The discourse in the child welfare literature has embraced multiple
parenthood through guardianship but has not yet endorsed non-exclusive
adoption. Katharine Bartlett’s article challenging the exclusivity of legal
parenthood discusses options like adoption with contact and guardianship,
but without suggesting that the law could recognize more than two
parents.137 In addition, Susan Mangold, writing several years before
multiple parenthood emerged in the case law or the literature,
recommended only open (but exclusive) adoption and guardianship as tools
to recognize multiple parenting.138 More recently, Cynthia Mabry proposed
removing the requirement for a sexual or marriage-like relationship as a
condition of adopting, proposing that siblings, for instance, be able to adopt
their niece or nephew jointly.139 This proposal would not, however, permit
an aunt (or two aunts) to adopt her (or their) sister’s child without
terminating her sister’s rights; rather, the argument is that “two parents are
better than none,” without recognizing the biological parents as part of the
equation and potentially entitled to legal parent status.140
133. ANDREA J. SEDLAK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOURTH NATIONAL
INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (NIS-4): REPORT TO CONGRESS 5-11–5-12 (2010).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 673 (2012).
135.
Similarly, Sacha Coupet argues that multiple parenthood should include kinship
caregivers—disproportionately black—and not only assisted reproductive technology cases. Coupet,
supra note 58, at 597–98.
136. Goodwin & Duke, supra note 12, at 1347–49.
137. Bartlett, supra note 6, at 945.
138. Mangold, supra note 30, at 869–73.
139. Cynthia R. Mabry, Joint and Shared Parenting: Valuing All Families and All Children in
the Adoption Process with an Expanded Notion of Family, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 659,
680 (2009). Mabry frames her argument around the needs of foster children awaiting adoption. Id. at
661–62.
140. Angela Mae Kupenda, Two Parents Are Better than None: Whether Two Single, African
American Adults—Who Are Not in a Traditional Marriage or a Romantic or Sexual Relationship with
Each Other—Should be Allowed to Jointly Adopt and Co-Parent African American Children, 35 U.
LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 703 (1997). Kupenda acknowledges biological parents’ role in their children’s
lives in a footnote. Id. at 704 n.2. She does not, however, propose third parent adoption—without
terminating parental rights—as a means of respecting that role. I do not fault Kupenda for that
omission; she wrote her article about one decade before the concept of three or more parents gained any
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A. The Law’s Limited Recognition of Three Parents
Certain areas of the law have begun recognizing the potential for more
than two legal parents. It is important not to overstate this recognition.
Multiple parenthood remains an emerging concept in the law. The Supreme
Court has decided family law cases on the assumption that the law could
recognize only two parents.141 Most famously, in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
the Court rejected a claim that the Constitution required recognition of
three parents: a child’s mother; her mother’s husband with whom she and
her mother had lived off and on and who contributed to her upbringing; and
her biological father with whom her mother had had an extra-marital affair
and with whom the child and her mother had lived on and off and who had
contributed to her upbringing.142 Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion
described the claim for multiple parenthood dismissively, stating that
“California law, like nature itself, makes no provision for dual
fatherhood.”143 But even that case did not foreclose applying some
constitutional protections to non-traditional family situations which might
involve multiple parent figures.144 The Supreme Court only spoke
regarding the Constitution; state legislatures and courts remained free to
reach different conclusions regarding state statutes and case law than
Justice Scalia reached regarding the Constitution.145
It should not be terribly surprising for legislatures to recognize more
than two parents because the trend in family law generally is towards
respecting the autonomy of individuals to order their family rights. The law
now respects pre-nuptial agreements (and even post-nuptial agreements),
and respects and enforces surrogacy agreements in many states. The
Supreme Court has cast doubt on laws that seek to enforce a particular
legal or academic traction. Similarly, Jessica Feinberg proposes permitting close platonic friends to
adopt children, arguing that such adoptions can provide more stability than the alternative of foster
children remaining in foster care. Jessica R. Feinberg, Friends as Co-Parents, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 799
(2009). Feinberg notes the many foster children “waiting for a family to adopt them,” but does not
discuss biological parents as individuals who could maintain a legal parent status. Id. at 801.
141. Bartlett, supra note 6, at 926 (describing the Court’s analysis in Quilloin v. Walcott, 434
U.S. 246 (1978), rejecting a biological father’s objection to a stepparent adoption, as ignoring the
possibility that two men—the biological and adoptive father—might both have some parental rights).
142. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
143. Id. at 118. See also id. at 130–31 (stating that child’s guardian ad litem’s argument that she
had “a due process right to maintain filial relationships with both Michael and Gerald . . . merits little
discussion, for . . . the claim that a State must recognize multiple fatherhood has no support in the
history or traditions of this country”).
144. Indeed, five Justices explicitly declined to foreclose the possibility of according
constitutional protections to the relationship between a child and his/her biological father, even when
the child’s mother was married to another man, who enjoyed a statutory presumption of paternity due to
the marriage. Id. at 133 (Stevens, J., concurring), 136 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Moreover, absent a
marriage between two potential parents, the historical “protect[ion of] the marital family” which
animated the Michael H. plurality is absent. Id. at 124 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
145. See id.
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vision of a proper family life in favor of family arrangements that develop
for sociological reasons,146 and has more broadly cautioned “against
attempts by the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the relationship
or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution
the law protects.”147 Over time, “family law follows family life,” and as
multiple parenthood arrangements become more frequent, we should
expect the law to evolve to provide some form of recognition to such
arrangements.148
Indeed, one state legislature and several state courts have offered some
limited recognition of multiple parenthood.149 These cases and legislative
efforts have two themes in common. First, they address situations that arise
due to ART and same-sex parenting, not from the need to find permanent
families for foster children. Second, they reflect anxiety about the
consequences of recognizing more than one parent and thus implicitly or
explicitly suggest how to prevent multiple parenthood from causing
increased litigation over children.
The American Law Institute’s (ALI) Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution has recognized for more than a decade that some situations
should lead to the recognition of more than one parent. The ALI proposed a
definition of a parent by estoppel,150 with such parents having standing to
file custody actions.151 Under the ALI’s definition, a man who is not the
biological father of a child, but who has a good faith belief that he is, and
contributes to raising the child, would be deemed “[a] parent by estoppel”
in certain circumstances.152 These Principles are now family law casebook
mainstays, providing ample room for classroom hypotheticals,153 and some
state legislatures have adopted statutes consistent with the ALI
Principles.154
The ALI’s proposal remains limited; the presence of a vertical parentlike relationship with a child is not enough to make an adult a parent by
estoppel. The proposal requires a horizontal marriage or marriage-like
146. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
147. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
148. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 132, at 2.
149. See D.C. Code §§ 16-831.01(1), 16-831.03 (2001); State ex rel. J.R. v. Mendoza, 481
N.W.2d 165 (Neb. 1992), superseded by statute, 1994 Neb. Laws 1224 § 58 & 1997 Neb. Laws 752 §
101, as recognized in Cesar C. v. Alicia L., 800 N.W.2d 249 (2011); Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d
473 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
150. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.03 (2002)
[hereinafter ALI FAMILY DISSOLUTION].
151. Id. § 2.04.
152. Id. § 2.03.
153. See DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS & SARAH H. RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW: DOCTRINE,
POLICY AND PRACTICE 171–75 (4th ed. 2010).
154. See D.C. CODE §§ 16-831.01(1), 16-831.03 (2001) (defining “de facto parent” and
permitting a de facto parent to seek custody of a child on the same legal status as any other parent).
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relationship between adults—for instance, situations in which the nonbiological father thought a couple were monogamous but was in fact
raising the child of another man, or in which an adult lives with the child
from birth, “holding out and accepting full and permanent responsibilities
as [a] parent” with the agreement of a biological parent.155 These scenarios
replicate a two-parent norm with a modest expansion to include situations
other than monogamous heterosexual marriage, but including a requirement
of some significant horizontal relationship between parents. The ALI is
thus not a more dramatic departure that would permit claims to parenthood
based on a vertical relationship alone.156
1. Case Law Recognizing Multiple Parenthood and ART
Two 2007 cases, one American and one Canadian, recognized multiple
parenthood in a more dramatic break from the norm than the ALI proposal.
Both considered similar facts: a lesbian couple uses a known sperm donor
to start a family; the two women live with and jointly raise the child, and
the male sperm donor remains involved and takes on a parent-like role. The
cases thus involve one woman who is a biological and functional parent,
one woman who is a functional parent, and one man who is a biological
parent and arguably a functional parent—though (like Tameka and Darnell
Sr.) with an explicitly less involved role than both women. Both cases
recognized all three as legal parents—at least to a limited degree. In
different ways, both implied that such recognition carried the risk of
custody fights with greater conflicts and decided in a manner that permitted
future courts to mitigate this concern.
The American case, Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, involved a custody case
between former partners who had jointly raised children—Jodilynn Jacob
and Jennifer Shultz-Jacob. Jacob became pregnant via sperm donated by a
friend, Carl Frampton, who never lived with Jacob or Shultz-Jacob, but was
involved with the children.157

155. ALI FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 150, § 2.03(1)(b).
156. The ALI Principles would also recognize the somewhat broader category of “de facto
parent,” which would include many primary caregivers. Id. § 2.03(1)(c). But the ALI would create a
hierarchy, placing de facto parents lower than biological parents and parents by estoppel; granting
custody to a “de facto parent” would be akin to granting custody to a third party who has served as a
primary caretaker, such as a grandparent, and who still must overcome a presumption in favor of
parental custody. This proposed hierarchy has generated legitimate criticism for favoring men—who are
more likely to qualify as a parent by estoppel if they raise another man’s biological child they think is
their own—over women—who are more likely to qualify as de facto parents by serving as primary
caregivers. Appleton, supra note 2, at 29–30.
157. 923 A.2d 473, 476 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). The case also involved two children adopted by
Jodilynn Jacob; I focus only on the children conceived with Frampton’s sperm—the children who
potentially could have three legal parents.
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Jacob’s status was most clear-cut: she was both a biological parent and
a functional parent. Shultz-Jacob’s was less so—she was a functional
parent but not a biological parent; the parties stipulated that she had in loco
parentis standing to seek custody.158 This status gave Shultz-Jacob a forum
to argue her case, but the court did not treat her as an equal party—she
faced strong legal presumptions in favor of the biological parent, Jacob,159
and the court’s analysis flowed from Shultz-Jacob’s inability “to override
the presumption in favor of the biological parent.”160 One can easily
critique this approach—relegating Shultz-Jacob to a lower legal status
despite her functional parenthood and otherwise equal relationship with
Jacob—and thus suggesting less-than-equal legal respect for same-sex
couples and their parenting decisions.161
Frampton’s status was also less than clear—he was a biological parent
and had some relationship, but he had less of a caregiving role than ShultzJacob, who was granted only a secondary status. The trial court granted
him visitation rights, and he did not challenge Jacob’s primary custody—
making any comparison between his status and hers moot. Based on his
parental role, the court did require him to pay child support.162
Jacob reveals a cautious approach to multiple parenthood. The
headline-grabbing result is the court’s recognition of three people as each
having some parental rights and duties. But the court assigned these rights
and duties in a way that maximizes financial support for the children—a
possible benefit of multiple parenthood—while reducing the risk of
ongoing custody battles—a risk of multiple parenthood. Granting ShultzJacob a lower legal status than Jacob effectively resolved the legal dispute
over custody and reduces the risk of future fights; facing a high burden of
proof, Shultz-Jacob can no longer fight effectively, and Frampton had
never shown an interest in contesting custody, making his relatively higher
legal status unlikely to induce litigation. This result did not respect the
parties’ intentions when the children were conceived and born; at that time,
Jacob and Shultz-Jacob planned to raise the child together in their home
with Frampton as a non-resident father. If asked at this point, the trio would
likely have said that all three should be treated as equals or that Frampton,
not Shultz-Jacob, be seen as lower in the parental hierarchy than either
resident parent.
Similarly cautious results are apparent in several earlier cases involving
coital reproduction; courts recognized “dual paternity” to obtain more child
158. Id. at 477.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 478.
161. Laura Nicole Althouse, Three’s Company? How American Law Can Recognize a Third
Social Parent in Same-Sex Headed Families, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 171, 187–88 (2008).
162. Jacob, 923 A.2d at 482.
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support payments, while leaving mechanisms to prevent the second father
from causing more fights over custody. State ex rel. J.R. v. Mendoza, a
1992 Nebraska case, is illustrative.163 The state sought child support from a
biological father to recoup costs of welfare payments to the child’s mother,
who had custody.164 The mother’s new husband had sought to be listed as
the child’s father on the birth certificate, and the biological father argued
that this action prevented the state from seeking support from him.165 The
Nebraska Supreme Court disagreed, thus permitting the recognition of a
third parent (the biological father) for purposes of obtaining child support.
The Court made clear, however, that this decision had no impact on the
custody or visitation rights regarding the child, and that the mother and her
husband could argue that he had no legal standing to seek custody.166
Louisiana courts have ruled similarly, finding that biological fathers were
responsible for child support even when children lived with their mothers
and their mothers’ husbands, who were legally presumed to be their fathers.
The court made clear that its recognition of dual paternity served the
children’s interests in obtaining support and did not interfere with the
husbands’ claim of legal paternity.167 There is only one case in which a
Louisiana court recognized a biological father as a third parent—in
addition to the child’s mother and her husband at the time of the birth, the
legal father—and permitted him to seek custody of the child.168 But in that
case, the child had lived with his legal father his entire life, and the court
found no reason to disrupt that arrangement.169 Recognizing the third
parent, therefore, came with an implied caution that such recognition does
not indicate a custody change.170
The Canadian case was more enthusiastic than the American cases
about multiple parenthood but still left room for future courts to avoid
conflict among multiple parents in future cases. The Ontario Court of

163. 481 N.W.2d 165, superseded by statute, 1994 Neb. Laws 1224 § 58 & 1997 Neb. Laws 752
§ 101, as recognized in Cesar C. v. Alicia L., 800 N.W.2d 249 (2011)
164. Id. at 167. This fact pattern shows the state’s interest in expanding the pool of parents from
whom child support can be collected.
165. Id. at 168–70.
166. Id. at 169–70.
167. Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847, 854–55 (La. 1989), superseded by statute, 2004 La. Acts
530, as recognized in Miller v. Thibeaux, 2015 WL 403199 (La. Jan. 28, 2015).
168. Geen v. Geen, 666 So. 2d 1192, 1195–96 (La. Ct. App. 1995), superseded by statute, 2004
La. Acts 530, as recognized in Miller v. Thibeaux, 2015 WL 403199 (La. Jan. 28, 2015).
169. Id. at 1196.
170. Other approaches exist that do not recognize dual paternity. The Texas legislature enacted a
law that permits a man who discovers that he is not the biological father of a child to file suit to
terminate any child support obligations he may have while simultaneously requesting visitation rights as
a means of protecting the child’s bonds with the man. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.005(l) (West 2008).
Such a man would not be a legal parent but could have visitation rights comparable to a non-custodial
parent after a divorce.
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Appeals declared in A.A. v. B.B. that the child “has three parents,” without
Jacob’s in loco parentis hierarchy.171 The functional but non-biological
parent, known as A.A., sued for a declaration that she was the child’s
mother. The court adopted the child’s lawyer’s argument that recognizing
all three parents served the child’s best interests, noting the value of a
“lifelong immutable declaration of status,” inheritance rights, right to
consent to adoption, and other important rights.172 Most importantly, the
court concluded that recognizing all parental figures as legal parents
normalizes the child’s experience.173 Intriguingly, the court explicitly noted
that adoption was not an option, because the adoption statute required
termination of one parent’s rights, thus making a declaration of parentage
the requested result.174 The same result could have been reached through
non-exclusive adoption.
Happily for all involved in this case, and unlike in Jacob v. ShultzJacob, A.A. was supported by the two biological parents, the couple with
primary custody remained intact, and the reported opinion does not suggest
that the adults fought over custody or child support.175 Still, any future
custody dispute would place all three parents on equal legal footing—
raising the prospect of a particularly difficult custody battle. The Canadian
court did not consider this possibility explicitly. But, the agreement
between the adults presented well-chosen facts to avoid that scenario. And,
the court recognized the functional mother as a legal mother based on the
undisputed finding that recognizing a third parent served the child’s best
interests.176 A future court, presumably, would be free to determine that
recognizing a third parent would exacerbate an existing custody dispute or
risk such a dispute, contrary to the child’s best interests. Thus, even without
explicitly addressing the concern that multiple parenthood could exacerbate
conflict, the Canadian court ruled in a manner that permitted such
consideration in future cases.
2. Legislation to Recognize Multiple Parenthood
In fall 2013, California enacted legislation to recognize more than two
parents, and thus abrogate state case law to the contrary.177 This legislation
171. 2007 ONCA 2, para. 1 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
172. Id. para. 14.
173. Id. para. 15.
174. Id. para. 13.
175. Id. paras. 4, 14.
176. Id. para. 37.
177.
S.B. 274, § 1(a), 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (enacted), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/13-14/bill/sen/sb_0251-0300/sb_274_bill_20131004_chaptered.pdf. A
similar bill (lacking the non-exclusive adoption provision) was passed by the California legislature in
2012, but vetoed by the Governor. S.B. 1476, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (vetoed), available at
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goes further than the American case law discussed above and, like A.A.,
explicitly permits recognition of three parents, all of whom could seek
custody on equal footing. The legislation directs a court to determine what
custodial arrangement would serve the best interests of the child, which in
three-parent cases would include “addressing the child’s need for
continuity and stability by preserving established patterns of care and
emotional bonds.”178 Notably, this legislation also permits non-exclusive
adoption; when adoptive and biological parents agreed, an adoption would
no longer relieve biological parents of all rights and responsibilities
regarding the child.179 This legislation took effect on January 1, 2014;180 as
of this writing, I am not aware of any reported cases applying the nonexclusive adoption provision.181
The California legislative effort appeared focused on same-sex couples
and their families far more than child welfare. When the governor vetoed a
similar bill in 2012, reactions followed predictable fault lines in ongoing
debates about LGBT individuals and families; LGBT rights organizations
announced their goal of working to enact a bill in the future,182 while
conservative religious organizations expressed their unequivocal opposition
to the bill.183 Ironically, the legislation seeks to overturn a case which arose
in the child welfare context: a child was removed from his biological
mother after her arrest as an accomplice to the attempted murder of her exwife, the child’s presumed, but not biological, parent. Both the ex-wife and
the child’s biological father sought status as parents; the court ruled that the
lower court had to determine which of these two individuals could claim to
be legal parents.184 Under the new legislation, the court could have

http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/sen/sb_1451-1500/sb_1476_bill_20120831_enrolled.pdf.
Governor Jerry Brown’s veto message stated that “the bill’s ambiguities may have unintended
consequences,” possibly suggesting a concern that this legislation could cause additional custody fights.
Veto Message, S.B. 1476 (Sept. 30, 2012), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/1112/bill/sen/sb_1451-1500/sb_1476_vt_20120930.html. Brown nonetheless declared
himself
“sympathetic” to the bill’s goals, id., and signed the similar bill which the Legislature passed in 2013.
178. S.B. 274, § 2, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013).
179. Id. § 7.
180. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 8617 (West Supp. 2015) (“Effective: January 1, 2014”).
181. A Westlaw search performed on February 26, 2015, revealed no cases citing the nonexclusive adoption provisions of California Family Code § 8617(b) decided since the non-exclusive
adoption provision took effect on January 1, 2014.
182. E.g., Press Release, Nat’l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights, California Governor Brown Vetoes Bill
that Would Protect Children with More than Two Parents (Sept. 30, 2012),
http://www.nclrights.org/press-room/press-release/ca-governor-brown-vetoes-bill-that-would-protectchildren-with-more-than-two-parents/.
183. E.g., Michael Gryboski, California Governor Vetoes Bill Stating Child Can Have More
Than Two Parents, CHRISTIAN POST, Oct. 1, 2012, http://www.christianpost.com/news/calif-governorvetoes-bill-stating-child-can-have-more-than-two-parents-82519/.
184. In re M.C., 124 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011); S.B. 274, § 1(b), 2013–2014 Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2013) (stating intention to abrogate In re M.C.).
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determined that the child’s best interests permitted it to recognize both as
parents.
Canadian legislators have also begun work to codify the rule developed
in A.A. A proposed “Uniform Child Status Act” permits application for
recognition as an “additional parent”—that is, for more than two legally
recognized parents—if all parties agreed in writing.185 British Columbia is
the only province thus far that has adopted similar legislation.186 Both the
uniform law and the British Columbia statute are expressly limited to
children conceived through ART and are designed to permit recognition of
sperm donors or surrogate mothers as parents; child welfare situations are
omitted.187
B. Issues in the Multiple Parent Literature—and Child Welfare’s
Relatively Clean Resolution
Courts’ reluctance to permit multiple parents to fight over child
custody and visitation, even when recognizing multiple parenthood for
child support purposes, and Governor Brown’s initial veto of legislation to
recognize three parents reflect a core concern in the three-parent literature:
that recognizing multiple parents will increase opportunities for conflict
detrimental to children. Indeed, some calls for multiple parenthood fail to
analyze this argument. This section will explore that and related concerns,
and argue that, while legitimate, child welfare law can resolve this concern
relatively cleanly.
1. Concerns about Multiple Parents Which Are Absent or Mitigated
in Child Welfare Cases
As the case law discussed above implies, multiple parenthood raises
the potential risks of more fighting over children; the more parental
authority is diffused, the more opportunities for conflict may arise.
Avoiding such conflict should be a core goal of family law and has
animated proposals for concentrating parental authority.188 Indeed, it is fair
185. UNIF. CHILD STATUS ACT § 9 (Uniform Law Conference of Can. 2010) (Can.), available at
http://ulcc.ca/en/uniform-acts-en-gb-1/86-child-status-act/1371-child-status-act-2010.
186. BRITISH COLUMBIA FAMILY LAW ACT ch. 25, pt. 3, div. 1 § 30, available at
http://www.bclaws.ca/EPLibraries/bclaws_new/document/LOC/freeside/—%20F%20—
/Family%20Law%20Act%20SBC%202011%20c.%2025/00_Act/11025_03.xml#section30.
187. Id.; UNIF. CHILD STATUS ACT § 9(2).
188. Perhaps most famously, Joseph Goldstein, Albert Solnit, Sonja Goldstein, and Anna Freud
proposed that the law should not force custodial parents to permit non-custodial parents to visit with
their children. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 23–27. When two parents could not agree, they
would have a court determine which parent obtains custody and then defer to that parent’s decision as a
means of giving children the “opportunity to settle down in the privacy of their reorganized family, with
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to worry that recognizing more parents and disaggregating parental
authority among multiple individuals will increase the likelihood of
disputes among the adults. These disputes can harm children directly, and
disaggregated parental authority can deny children the benefits of clear
decision-making authority that the parental rights doctrine provides.189 As
Adam Pertman has written regarding open adoption:
Open adoption is not co-parenting. Members of the triad [adoptive
parents, birth parents, child] should repeat that like a mantra, and
explain it to their friends and relatives, because its acceptance will
not only alleviate some of their own stresses but also will help
everyone in our society feel more comfortable about this curious
concept as it takes hold and grows more visible.190
Because of the potential for more disagreement among all parents,
recognizing more than two parents thus invites “a fresh look at the special
challenges of shared decisionmaking.”191 Existing academic calls for
multiple parenthood decline to fully explore these challenges. Michele
Goodwin and Naomi Duke, for instance, propose “parent civil unions” as a
positive alternative to extended foster care.192 Goodwin and Duke
acknowledge the “fragility of family,” but do not address the increased
possibility for conflicts that comes with an increasing number of parents.193
In addition, Sacha Coupet makes a compelling argument for providing
greater legal recognition to kinship caregivers and proposes “kinship
adoption,” in which kinship caregivers could adopt a child without

one person in authority upon whom they can rely for answers to their questions and for protection from
external interference.” Id. at 24.
189. Rebecca Aviel, A New Formalism for Family Law, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2003, 2063
(2014); Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REV. 649,
683, 707–08 (2008); Emily Buss, “Parental” Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 643–44 (2002); Bartlett,
supra note 6, at 945.
I do not intend to criticize disaggregation of parental authority more broadly. Parenting plans that
require parents to divide up parental authority and “parenting time” with precise detail, see, e.g.,
Petition
for
Child
Custody
Forms
(July
2010),
available
at
http://www.selfrepresent.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=38348, in contrast to earlier calls to concentrate parental
authority in only one individual. E.g., GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 23–27. I focus on
disaggregation of parental authority across more than two legal parents; disaggregation among two
parents is beyond the scope of this Article.
190. PERTMAN, supra note 17, at 10–11.
191. Appleton, supra note 2, at 44–45.
192. Goodwin & Duke, supra note 12.
193. Id. at 1377. This criticism does not mean Goodwin and Duke’s proposal should be rejected;
multiple parenthood, even with increased risks of conflicts among parents, may still be preferable to
children living in foster care, and its associated bad outcomes. By focusing on multiple parents other
than biological parents, it would make little sense for Goodwin and Duke to address a hierarchy of
parenthood—a solution that becomes apparent when focusing on cases like Darnell Jr. Infra notes 200–
203 and accompanying text.
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terminating biological parents’ rights.194 Coupet’s focus is on the normative
argument; she does not claim to provide a “roadmap” for how this legal
option would work or how the law could govern shared decisionmaking
among more than two people.195 Nor does Coupet examine whether nonexclusive adoption should extend beyond kinship situations to include any
foster parent or other caregiver who has a strong bond with the child and
who agrees with the biological parents that non-exclusive adoption would
best serve the child.
The child welfare field provides vivid illustrations of both the need to
manage shared decision-making authority and the experience for how to do
so. The law’s strong push to achieve permanency for foster children serves
to reduce the risks posed by disaggregating parental rights. When a child is
in foster care, parental rights are divided among various individuals and
entities: a state child protection agency has legal custody and entrusts foster
parents with physical custody. Biological parents retain the right to visit
and other decision-making rights. Biological parents, for instance, retain
the right to make special education decisions (unless a court orders
otherwise),196 and in some jurisdictions, neither the foster parent nor child
welfare agency has the authority to obtain certain medical or mental health
care for a foster child without a biological parent’s consent or a court
order.197 A core value of reaching permanency—in any form—is reversing
this disaggregation and giving the individuals most familiar with a child’s
needs the authority to meet those needs.
Perhaps because child welfare law addresses the concerns of
disaggregating parental rights in every case, it has developed significant
experience with allocating parental authority among multiple individuals.
This allocation is precisely what guardianship accomplishes—the guardian
obtains day-to-day decision-making authority and physical custody.
Several discrete authorities are reserved for parents—the right to visit, and
for instance, the right to consent to a child’s marriage or adoption.
Moreover, allocating parental authority in this manner poses
significantly less risk for future conflicts than allocating authority equally.
Child welfare cases resolved through means other than reunification are
very likely to concentrate parental authority in the individual other than the
biological parent, Terrence, in this Article’s ongoing hypothetical. Not only
will that individual have primary physical custody of the child, but the
child’s parents will have been found unfit—their abuse or neglect is what
led to the child coming into foster care to begin with. Moreover, that parent
194.
195.
196.
197.

Coupet, supra note 58, at 653.
Id. at 601; see also id. at 653–54 (describing briefly how such adoptions would work).
34 C.F.R. § 300.30 (2014).
See In re G.K., 993 A.2d 558 (D.C. 2010).
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has been unable to rehabilitate in the months or years that followed—
otherwise the case would have lead to reunification rather than adoption or
guardianship. Thus, in child welfare cases, shared decisionmaking is not
truly on the table, and non-exclusive adoption would not be an invitation to
co-parent.198 In contrast, multiple parent cases outside of child welfare
would not likely involve allegations of abuse or neglect, and authority
would be divided among three fit parents. Thus each non-custodial parent
would likely have more authority than the non-custodial parents would
have in a child welfare case, and that relative increase in authority would
increase the possibilities for conflict.
Susan Appleton has identified one option for managing multiple
parenthood’s potential for conflict—establishing a hierarchy of parents, in
which one parent has greater decision-making authority than others.
Appleton recognizes the downside to this option—such a hierarchy
threatens the law’s commitment to equality among parents, an especially
important point for a legal reform designed to establish equality for nontraditional families.199 But a hierarchy of parents is a natural fit for child
welfare cases because these cases involve findings of parental unfitness and
a failure to rectify that unfitness.
Moreover, in child welfare cases, something has already gone awry to
disrupt the two-parent norm and permitted multiple individuals, both
biological parents and otherwise, to develop close bonds with children.200
By the time a court can determine that reunification is not likely to occur
and thus must choose between alternative permanency options, multiple
parent-like relationships already exist in many cases. That bell cannot be
un-rung. Accordingly, any adoption of foster children would respect the
principle that “the law should not allow nonparents to exercise parental
status unless the child’s relationship with his legal or natural parent has
been interrupted.”201 This reality contrasts with cases, especially ART
198. Cf. PERTMAN, supra note 17 and accompanying text.
199. Appelton, supra note 2, at 59. The threat to equality is evident in David Meyer’s 1999
proposal for “non-consensual open adoption” as a means to resolve contested adoption cases such as the
well-publicized “Baby Jessica” and “Baby Richard” cases. Meyer, supra note 33, at 817, 823. In those
cases, courts ordered the children transferred from the custody of prospective adoptive parents who had
raised them from infancy to their biological fathers who had been thwarted in their efforts to raise their
children. Meyer’s proposal would have kept the children with adoptive parents but let the fathers
maintain a legal status as parent. But the fathers could only seek custody under “extraordinary
circumstances” and the adoptive parents—not the fit father—would have “full decision-making
authority in matters of child-rearing.” Id. at 818, 821. This hierarchy might limit legal conflicts between
parents, but at the cost of treating a fit parent unequally.
200. Similar analyses apply to many kinship caregiving situations in which extended family raise
children without the child welfare system’s involvement. Sacha Coupet offers an example of
grandparents raising a grandchild because the child’s mother battles a drug addiction and “is an
infrequent presence in her son’s life.” Coupet, supra note 58, at 600–01. In such cases, a hierarchy of
parents would also be appropriate.
201. Bartlett, supra note 6, at 946.
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cases, which ask whether to recognize multiple parents at the outset of a
child’s life, without knowing what type of relationship the child will
develop with each adult, and when each adult would be a fit parent. The
law could allocate responsibilities between such parents at the same time
that the law recognizes multiple parents, as one commentator has
suggested.202 This solution may be workable, but it provides a less
compelling resolution to the shared decision-making challenge than exists
in child welfare. It invites all potential parents to fight over parental roles
and responsibilities at the outset. In child welfare, however, the child’s
removal and placement in foster care, and the absence of subsequent
reunification, has created a need for a third parent to be the primary
caregiver.203 And recognizing multiple parenthood at the beginning of a
child’s life does little to deter future fights—if a parent seeks to modify the
allocation of parental authority, the parents would litigate on equal footing.
In contrast, in a child welfare case, a biological parent seeking to modify
custody arrangements after a non-exclusive adoption would have to
establish his or her rehabilitation from previous findings of unfitness.
If the concern about multiple parenthood is that it could harm children
(and adults) by incentivizing additional litigation, then child welfare cases
present a different and particularly strong response: a foster child is by
definition already subject to litigation, and the goal of protecting children
from unnecessary litigation requires ending that child welfare litigation. As
argued above,204 if offering non-exclusive adoption in child welfare cases
can help avoid unnecessary and harmful litigation, then offering that option
serves the policy goal of avoiding harmful litigation. At worst, it would
provide the benefit of avoiding litigation in the present while creating the
risk of more litigation in the future—a trade worth making. At best, it
would avoid litigation in the present and, as described in the preceding
paragraphs, greatly diminish the likelihood of future litigation.
In addition, child welfare cases do not invoke the most politically
controversial elements of calls for recognizing multiple parenthood.
Multiple parenthood advocates seek to challenge the heteronormative,
conjugal focus of family law,205 and opponents of multiple parenthood may

202. Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two? Disaggregating Traditional Parental Rights and
Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 309, 326 (2007).
203. Ensuring that all children removed from their families and placed in foster care must truly
be removed is a distinct question, which is the beyond the scope of this Article. Similarly, it is essential
that decisions about the possibility of reunification and whether to pursue that or the creation of a new
permanent family follow rigorous procedures, as I have argued elsewhere. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 99.
204. See supra Part II.b.
205. Laura T. Kessler, for instance, asserts “the potential of community parenting to undermine
traditional gender roles and intensive mothering standards.” Community Parenting, 24 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 47, 52 (2007).
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seek to retain traditional limits on the definition of marriage.206 Child
welfare cases do not raise those debates to the same degree. Even when
child welfare cases involve same-sex couples seeking to become parents, it
is possible to separate the issues involved in third-party adoption from
issues involved in LGBT individuals or couples adopting foster children.207
Recognizing three adults like Terrence, Tameka, and Darnell Sr., as
parents does challenge the continuing legal assumption that a past or
present sexual relationship between adults is an essential element of joint
parenthood,208 and thus joins other calls for multiple parenthood in
challenging the two heterosexual parent model of parenthood.209 But in the
child welfare field, this challenge is not as “radical” as it may appear at
first, or in other factual scenarios.210 Indeed, it is not radical at all. The
child welfare field has already accepted implicit challenges to this
assumption through its prevalent use of guardianship; guardianship cases
involve platonic relationships between guardians and parents. There is no
reason why platonic relationships between adoptive and biological parents
should raise any concerns when guardianship cases do not.
Foster care cases also involve a stronger claim on state recognition to
multiple parenthood because state action created the multiple parent-like
relationships. The state removes foster children from their biological
parents and places them with foster parents. Emotional bonds between
foster parents and foster children “have their origins in an arrangement in
which the State has been a partner from the outset.”211 The state-mediated
nature of foster care limits foster parents’ claim to a due process right to
continued custody.212 But as a matter of policy, it does provide an argument
unique to foster care: the state should not preclude recognition of all
parent–child relationships that exist, especially when the state itself helped
create those relationships. Claims for recognition of multiple parenthood of
206. Appleton, supra note 2, at 53 (identifying “this same challenge to gender norms at the root
of the opposing view as well”).
207. This is not to say that LGBT individuals or couples do not seek to adopt foster children; just
the contrary—they do so in disproportionate numbers. And certain state efforts to prevent LGBT
individuals or couples from adopting children has been litigated in child welfare contexts. For instance,
Florida’s statute banning adoption by homosexual individuals, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West
2012), was declared unconstitutional in 2010 when a gay foster parent successfully petitioned to adopt
his foster children. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families v. X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2010). Previously, the Eleventh Circuit had dismissed a constitutional challenge to the statute. Lofton v.
Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004).
208. Kim, supra note 125, at 57.
209. See Goodwin & Duke, supra note 12, at 1372 (“By articulating an alternative family
paradigm, we urge reconsideration of the two-parent, married, heterosexual unit as the foundation for
family.”).
210. Goodwin and Duke, for instance, repeatedly label their challenge as “a radical rethinking of
family.” Id. at 1342, 1388.
211. Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977).
212. Id.
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children conceived through ART—however powerful they may be—do not
involve state action in a comparable way.
2. Child Welfare Cases are Particularly Strong Examples for Core
Multiple Parenthood Arguments
In other respects, child welfare law provides an apt forum to carry the
challenge that multiple parenthood represents to traditional family law.
Limiting legal recognition to two parents serves “to naturalize a normative
family in which only enduringly monogamous heterosexual couples
reproduce.”213 There is much appropriate focus on changing key elements
of that sentence—so homosexual couples can be parents, so other families
using ART (especially same-sex couples) can be recognized, and so all of a
child’s most important relationships with caregivers and decision makers,
regardless of whether adults’ relationships prove to be enduringly
monogamous, can be maintained. All of these examples focus on the
relationship status of the parents, and the fights over their status reflect
society’s ongoing conflicts over adult relationships. A core argument for
advocates of multiple parenthood is about respecting relationships adults
have with children.
That argument is particularly salient in child welfare cases, because
child welfare law has long focused on factors of functional parenthood and
each adult’s relationship with the child instead of the existence of a stable,
two-parent, heterosexual bond.
3. Maximizing Child Support
The few court cases to recognize multiple parenthood do so, at least in
part, to maximize child support, which they recognize as important to
children’s interests.214 Non-exclusive adoption is fully consistent with that
goal. Adoptive parents would become liable for child support. If, for
instance, Terrence has a partner and they both adopt Darnell Jr., and some
time later Terrence and his partner separate, then the adoption would
ensure that the non-custodial adoptive parent has an ongoing child support
obligation.215 This feature is another that would make non-exclusive
adoption seem more permanent than guardianship—guardianship would
not trigger a permanent child support obligation while adoption would.216

213. Appleton, supra note 2, at 21.
214. Supra notes 157–169 and accompanying text.
215. Mabry, supra note 139, at 676–77.
216. See Testa, Quality of Permanence, supra note 27, at 505 (comparing financial responsibility
in guardianship and adoption).
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At the same time, non-exclusive adoption would maintain biological
parents’ child support obligations. In theory, the law could impose an
ongoing child support duty on biological parents even after termination of
parental rights.217 Nonetheless, parental rights and responsibilities are
generally created or destroyed together, and terminating parental rights
generally terminates parents’ child support obligations.218
V. HOW TO GET THERE
Despite not being discussed much by policymakers or commentators,
non-exclusive adoption in child welfare is an achievable outcome through
both legislative advocacy and litigation. Indeed, California enacted
legislation to permit non-exclusive adoption in all cases.219 If such broad
legislation can be enacted, then surely narrower legislation limited to child
welfare situations should stand a chance of enactment. Moreover, the
recent history of litigation to permit second-parent adoptions by same-sex
partners suggests that creative arguments exist to convince courts to permit
non-exclusive adoption in child welfare cases. This section outlines ideal
components of non-exclusive adoption statutes for child welfare cases and
possible arguments that courts should interpret existing statutes to permit
non-exclusive adoption.
A. Statutory Reform
1. California Legislation and Child Welfare-Specific Provisions
As noted above,220 California has adopted legislation to permit adoptive
and biological parents to agree that the adoption will not terminate the
biological parent’s parental duties and responsibilities. This provision
would permit same-sex couples using ART to recognize three parents.
Consider, for instance, two married or otherwise partnered gay men who
arranged with a woman to conceive a child using that woman’s egg and one
of the men’s sperm. The non-biological father could then adopt the child,
and the three adults could agree whether or not that action should terminate
a parent–child relationship that might exist between the child and
biological mother. But the new law appears broader—its plain language
217. JAMES G. DWYER, THE RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 167–68 (2006).
218. The Uniform Adoption Act provides that a termination ends all aspects of a parent–child
relationship; only arrearages incurred before the termination are excepted. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 3505(a) (1994). Even that modest step is beyond many state statutes. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 453.090.1 (West 2014), declaring that an adoption ends “all rights and duties” of a biological parent).
219. Supra notes 177–179 and accompanying text.
220. Supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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seems clear that it would permit non-exclusive adoptions in all situations,
including child welfare adoptions.
Under the California legislation, the relative authority of three parents
would not necessarily be adjudicated; the three hypothetical parents in the
above scenario would have equal legal claim to the child. Such an
arrangement would not likely be appropriate in child welfare cases in
which the law creates a new parent or guardian relationship because the
biological parents have been declared unfit in the past and subsequently
declared unable to reunify.
Any child welfare-specific, non-exclusive adoption statute should
include a parenting plan that gives full legal and primary physical custody
to the adoptive parent(s). Biological parents would have rights to visit and
other residual rights provided for in guardianship statutes, plus the legal
identity of a parent. These parents could seek to modify the parenting plan,
but they would face a high burden for doing so; adopting such parenting
plans would thus mitigate the risk that multiple parenthood would multiply
conflict. California should consider child welfare-specific reforms to its
new, non-exclusive adoption statute, and other states should consider
implementing non-exclusive adoption provisions at least for child welfare
cases. Such statutes should include express provisions permitting, if not
requiring, the parties to submit a joint parenting plan to be included with
the adoption order. Such parenting plans would usually, if not always,
provide the adoptive parent with at least the powers granted to legal
guardians.
Such a statute should also make clear provisions for the following
situations:
First, legislation should require consent of all parents as a condition of
granting a non-exclusive adoption. Present disagreements between
potential parents regarding their respective legal statuses suggests too high
of a risk of future conflicts—the precise concern regarding multiple
parenthood that any non-exclusive adoption statute should attempt to avoid.
A consent requirement thus requires a focus on the horizontal relationship
between biological and adoptive parents; if these adults cannot agree on a
non-exclusive adoption, then the risk of future conflicts would be too great
to proceed. Although this Article generally urges a focus on vertical
relationships between children and caregivers, this limited horizontal focus
acknowledges the impact that disagreements between adults can have on
children.
Second, legislation should encourage succession planning to avoid
disputes regarding who will raise the child if the adoptive parent dies or
becomes incapacitated. In some cases, a biological parent would be the
appropriate choice. But the bulk of cases are likely to involve biological
parents who cannot serve as primary custodians, at least at the time of the
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adoption. In such situations, identifying a successor guardian—a person
who would become guardian upon the adoptive parent’s death or
incapacity—may be appropriate. Similar provisions exist in state
guardianship statutes221 and should apply to non-exclusive adoption cases.
Third, legislation should provide clear standards for motions to modify.
A child welfare-focused, non-exclusive adoption statute should provide that
any party seeking to modify the parenting plan, presumably one of the
biological parents, would have the burden of proving a substantial and
material change in circumstances and that the modification serves the
child’s best interests. Such a provision would clarify that the biological
parents cannot claim a higher legal status than the adoptive parent in such a
proceeding—unlike many state court decisions in guardianship
modification cases.222 Moreover, parents who have been found unfit—a
prerequisite to having their children removed from them—would have to
establish rehabilitation. These provisions would create a relatively clear
burden on biological parents who seek to modify custody arrangements
without the consent of the adoptive parent and thus deter unnecessary and
harmful litigation.
Fourth, legislation should include provisions to preserve the adoption
in case of future disputes. Like many post-adoption contact statutes, nonexclusive adoption statutes should provide that any later litigation to
enforce a visitation arrangement or modify a parenting plan cannot serve to
reverse or abrogate the adoption itself.223 The adoptive parent–child
relationship should be as permanent as any parent–child relationship.
2. More Modest Statutory Reforms
The above proposals describe legislation that would be a dramatic
break from existing law and practice. While California has adopted a nonexclusive adoption statute, it is unclear whether other states would as well.
It is, therefore, worth considering more modest statutory reforms. Here are
three possibilities:
First, adoption statutes could be amended to provide, at least in certain
cases, that former foster children retain the right to inherit from their
biological parents. Such a provision would be akin to § 4-103(b)(3) of the
Uniform Adoption Act, which provides for an ongoing right to inheritance
in step-parent adoptions. Like post-adoption contact or non-exclusive

221. E.g., D.C. CODE § 16-2398 (2001).
222. Supra note 15 and accompanying text.
223. E.g., D.C. CODE § 4-361 (2010). The absence of such provisions has permitted litigation in
which birth parents seek to revoke their consent to their children’s adoptions. Sanger, supra note 18, at
324–31.
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adoption, such a provision should be based on the consent of adoptive and
biological parents.
Second, state statutes should provide that adoptions—at least adoptions
of foster children—should have no effect on the legal relationship between
siblings or extended family members. Such statutes would codify the
results in certain cases which currently reflect exceptions to the normal
practice.224
Relatedly, the federal government should clarify via regulations that
siblings are defined to include siblings by blood, regardless of any adoption
that has affected the siblings’ legal relationship. The federal child welfare
statute’s rebuttable preference for siblings to be placed in the same home
or, if not, to have visits225 should apply fully to adopted children and their
not-adopted siblings. Case-specific facts might, of course, overcome that
preference, but the analysis should begin with respecting the sibling
relationships that do exist.
Third, the federal government should require states to report the
number of closed adoptions, adoptions with enforceable contact
agreements, non-exclusive adoptions, and guardianships to the federal
government.226 Federal child welfare law already requires detailed data
reporting from the states as a condition of federal funding.227 Whether
through legislation, regulation, or other administrative action, the federal
government should require more specific information about the types of
adoptions that occur in state courts every year.228 Such data would provide
essential information to guide policymakers in the future; for instance, all
states could observe how any California legislation affects foster care
adoptions and guardianships and then make policy decisions accordingly.
B. Test Cases
Lawyers should also consider developing test cases to attempt to
establish third-party adoption via litigation. Such litigation could lead to
victories in court, and even litigation losses can inspire calls for legislative
224. Supra notes 112–114 and accompanying text.
225. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(31) (2012).
226. Federal law could also require states to permit non-exclusive adoption of foster children as a
condition of federal funding, just as features are required. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a). The federal government,
however, has not led much child welfare reform and has more frequently codified reforms that have
taken hold across many states. I am thus more concerned about federal law not imposing any obstacles
to state laws permitting non-exclusive adoption than with federal law requiring states to adopt such
laws. Cf. Vivek S. Sankaran, Innovation Held Hostage: Has Federal Intervention Stifled Efforts to
Reform the Child Welfare System?, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 281 (2007).
227. 42 U.S.C. § 679a, b (2012).
228. Legislation may be unnecessary as the statutory text directs the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to develop, and promulgate regulations regarding, the data-reporting system. 42 U.S.C.
§ 679a(1); 45 C.F.R. § 1356.81–83 (2013).
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change, as occurred in California.229 Such litigation would have to face
statutes that, as discussed above, seem to require that any adoption
terminates biological parents’ rights with only the narrow exception of
stepparent adoption, in which the adoptive parent is married to the
biological parent. Plausible—though certainly not foolproof—arguments to
the contrary can be made.
The history of same-sex couples seeking equal rights to parent—a key
motivator in the broader multiple parenthood movement—suggests that
such arguments could succeed.230 Adoption statutes used to be understood
to require a marriage between a stepparent and a biological parent for
stepparent (or second parent) adoption statutes to apply. In the days before
same-sex couples were permitted to marry in any state, these statutes
seemed to preclude those couples from pursuing second-parent adoption.
The statutes were also understood to provide that a child could only have
one parent of a particular gender. Yet, motivated by the strong equities
involved, state courts adopted statutory arguments that permitted such
adoptions.231 Similar results may be possible in child welfare cases with
particularly sympathetic facts.
Indeed, at least one recent case has applied the logic of cases
permitting second-parent adoption by a same-sex partner to different fact
patterns and eliminated the need for a marriage between opposite sex
partners. An Indiana appellate court, for instance, permitted a parent’s
fiancé to adopt the child without terminating the parent’s parental rights.232
The statute provided that the adoptive parent had to be “married to a
biological parent of the child,”233 but prior case law had permitted same-sex
partners to adopt even without a marriage.234 The logic of that case applied
in full force beyond same-sex partners’ second-parent adoptions, despite
the ability of heterosexual couples to become married: the statute exists to
serve children’s best interests, and avoid “instability and uncertainty arising
from unwanted intrusions by the child’s biological family.”235
Applying this logic to a non-exclusive adoption of a foster child would
require the analysis to go a step further, and include an individual who is
not living with the adoptive parent, and to permit legal recognition of more
229. Supra note 184 and accompanying text.
230. I thank Susan Appleton for suggesting this argument.
231. E.g., In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995) (permitting a mother’s unmarried partner,
regardless of the couple’s sexual orientation, to adopt the mother’s child without terminating her rights);
Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993) (ruling that unmarried cohabitants, one of whom is
the child’s biological parent, may jointly petition to adopt and that granting the adoption does not
terminate the biological parent’s rights).
232. R.S.P. v. S.S. (In re Adoption of J.T.A.), 988 N.E.2d 1250, 1254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
233. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-15-2 (West 2008).
234. In re Adoption of K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d 1253, 1259–60 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
235. Id. at 1257 (cited in In re J.T.A., 988 N.E.2d at 1253).
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than two parents. This would arguably make the adoption different than
“the creation of a legal family unit identical to the actual [cohabiting]
family setup.”236 Yet the same argument would apply. A non-exclusive
adoption would not reflect an existing “intra-family adoption,”237 at least in
the sense that no existing legal bonds tie Terrence to Tameka or Darnell Sr.
But those three individuals are tied to Darnell Jr., and each acts as a parent
to him. All three are “in fact acting as parents,” and so a “destructive
choice” about who should lose the legal title of “parent” is not required.238
When sought with the consent of all parents and with the submission of a
parenting plan granting the adoptive parent legal and primary physical
custody, there is a lesser need to “shield the adoptive family from
unnecessary instability and uncertainty arising from unwanted intrusions by
the child’s biological family.”239
The statutory argument to be made in any case would depend, of
course, on the specific statute that applies. A particularly appealing
argument exists under the Uniform Adoption Act—though the UAA has
not been widely adopted.240 The Uniform Adoption Act provides:
For good cause shown, a court may allow an individual who does
not meet the requirements of subsection (a) [i.e., is not married to
the parent], but has the consent of the custodial parent of a minor to
file a petition for adoption under this [article]. A petition allowed
under this subsection must be treated as if the petitioner were a
stepparent.241
The UAA thus would not terminate the biological parent’s rights. The plain
language of this provision would seem to apply to Darnell Jr. Terrence
could file with Tameka and Darnell Sr.’s consent. The hardest provision of
this statutory language would be whether Tameka and Darnell Sr. count as
“custodial parents”—though their intact parental rights and the fact that
they were the most recent parents to have legal custody counsels in favor of
treating them as custodial parents. The UAA comments suggest that this
provision was intended for someone “who is a de facto stepparent” but has
not married the parent,242 but the plain language of the statute is written
more broadly and should make resort to those comments unnecessary.
236. In re Adoption of Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1000 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1992) (cited in In re
K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d at 1258).
237. In re J.T.A., 988 N.E.2d at 1253.
238. In re K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d at 1260 (cited in In re J.T.A., 988 N.E.2d at 1253).
239. Id. at 1257 (cited in In re J.T.A., 988 N.E.2d at 1253).
240. The relevant provision has been adopted in Vermont. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 4-101
(2010).
241. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 4-102(b) (1994) (alterations in original).
242. Id. § 4-102 cmt. at 99.
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The statutory argument would be different in the vast majority of states
which have not adopted the UAA. Nonetheless, possibilities exist. For
instance, Missouri law exempts “a natural parent who joins in the petition
for adoption as provided in section 453.010” from the rule that adoption
terminates a biological parent’s legal relationship with a child.243 Section
453.010, in turn makes reference to a spouse joining a petition,244 but
nothing in the statute explicitly permits or prohibits a parent who is not
married to a parent from joining a petition. A test case would thus involve a
parent like Tameka or Darnell Sr. joining the petition of a foster parent like
Terrence.
Any such test case would depend heavily on the equities involved.
Most adoption statutes include best interest of the child language such as
Missouri’s, which directs courts to grant adoption petitions “as the welfare
of the person sought to be adopted may, in the opinion of the court,
demand.”245 And any lawyer litigating such a case should develop as many
facts as possible to establish how the equities support granting a nonexclusive adoption.
VI. CONCLUSION
Much has been written about breaking down family law’s traditional
rules regarding exclusive parenthood limited to two parents who have, or
have had, a sexual relationship. This conversation should more prominently
include child welfare adoption cases. At the very least, child welfare cases
and the child welfare field’s experience with multiple parenthood provides
important lessons for family law more broadly. In particular, a core concern
regarding multiple parenthood is the risk of multiplying opportunities for
adult conflicts to lead to harmful litigation. For skeptics of multiple
parenthood, child welfare should represent an exception—a field in which
ready legal mechanisms exist which can significantly mitigate if not
entirely resolve these concerns. For advocates of multiple parenthood, child
welfare could represent an initial entry point to demonstrate that multiple
parenthood has existed in fact in many cases and should be recognized in
law—and that such recognition does not have to threaten family stability.
Non-exclusive parenthood has significant value in its own right in the
child welfare field. Cases like Darnell Jr.’s—and thousands like it—call out
for a permanency option that respects children’s lived reality of multiple
parents. Providing that legal option will provide permanency options that
better fit children’s real lives and which provide children with more rights
243. MO. ANN. STAT. § 453.090.1 (West 2014).
244. Id. § 453.010.4.
245. Id. § 453.030.1.
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that depend on a parent–child relationship, will help more children leave
foster care to permanent families, and will help avoid unnecessary and
harmful litigation in termination of parental rights cases.

